

**Security Council**

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Letter dated 3 September 2026 from the Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) have the honour to transmit herewith the final report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 13 of resolution [2794 \(2025\)](#).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti on 24 July 2026 and was considered by the Committee on 3 September 2026.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and the final report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

Panel of Experts on Haiti established pursuant to
Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#)



Final report of the Panel of Experts on Haiti submitted pursuant to resolution 2794 (2025)

[Original: English]

Summary

The reporting period (October 2025–July 2026) began amid significant political friction between members of the Transitional Presidential Council and the Prime Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, ahead of the end of the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council on 7 February. On that day, executive power was ultimately transferred to the Council of Ministers, led by the Prime Minister. On 23 February, a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections was adopted by a range of political, civil society and economic actors. However, as of mid-July, implementation of the Pact – particularly the security objectives – remained slow, further eroding domestic confidence in the transition. Although some progress was recorded in electoral preparations, the electoral calendar remained uncertain.

Since December 2025, security operations by the Haitian authorities have contributed to halting the expansion of gangs in Port-au-Prince and cleared some areas from gang control, including in downtown, Delmas and surrounding areas. The absence of a national security strategy, limited resources and persistent ties between gangs and key stakeholders continued to constrain the overall security response.

The scale of the security challenges, combined with the limited capacity of national institutions, resulted in a fragmented security response with a proliferation of armed actors. On the one hand, the Government's security approach is relying heavily on international actors, including a foreign private military contractor and the Gang Suppression Force, which started its operations in June. On the other hand, the population is increasingly turning to self-defence groups, private security companies and the Protected Areas Security Brigade to fill the security vacuum. Although self-defence groups represent the main buffer against gang attacks in many areas, some engaged in criminal activities and human rights violations and risk perpetuating the country's cycle of violence by contributing to the next generation of gangs.

After holding together for more than two years, there were violent fractures in the Viv Ansanm gang alliance during the reporting period, driven by competition over territory and revenue. Infighting in Port-au-Prince, particularly in Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets communes between March and July, killed several hundred people and displaced thousands. During clashes, incidents of sexual violence surged as a tool of retaliation between rival gangs.

March 2026 also marked the onset of a new wave of violence in the lower Artibonite Department, with coordinated attacks of an unprecedented intensity by the Gran Grif, Kokorat San Ras and Canaan gangs across dozens of localities. In the Centre Department, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs continued to consolidate their control over several towns and to secure key routes to the border with the Dominican Republic, through which they traffic goods, including arms and ammunition, and generate significant revenue from road checkpoints. In the South-East Department, recent gang attacks marked a concerning new development in what had previously been a relatively safe region.

Despite intensified security operations by the Haitian authorities supported by a private military contractor, gangs have demonstrated considerable resilience and adaptability, particularly owing to the support of the ecosystem of actors who have a stake in gang activities. This includes specific political, economic and security actors who back gangs when it serves their interests, as well as the intermediaries they use. Targeting gang leaders without addressing the networks that sustain them will inevitably fall short. Sanctioning these enabling actors remains key to the effectiveness of the United Nations sanctions regime.

Between October 2025 and April 2026, 3,165 people were killed and 1,551 injured as a result of armed violence, with 65% of casualties occurring during security operations and 30% during gang attacks. Gangs led by designated individuals continued to commit serious human rights abuses, among them killings, sexual and gender-based violence, kidnapping for ransom, forced recruitment of children, destruction of property and extortion. Beyond sanctioned individuals, many other gang leaders continued to engage in actions that meet designation criteria. Sexual violence has also escalated sharply since early 2026, with the collective rape of women and girls by armed men constituting one of its most severe manifestations. Gang violence impeded access to humanitarian assistance and basic services, including education, and led to the closure of several medical facilities and charitable organizations.

Successive waves of intense armed violence reflect the continued ability of gangs and other non-State armed actors to illicitly acquire firearms and, more critically, ammunition. While authorities in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the United States of America have taken steps to address trafficking and enforce the arms embargo, these efforts remain insufficient given the scale of the challenge. Transnational networks, often displaying unsophisticated methods, have proven to be resilient and efficient in trafficking firearms and ammunition during the reporting period. Diversions from national stockpiles – from Haiti and, to a lesser extent, from the Dominican Republic – continue to replenish the arsenals of gangs and other non-State armed actors.

Insecurity and the absence of effective governance have created conditions conducive to the growth of illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime more broadly. Beyond arms, the Panel investigated record seizures of cocaine and cannabis during the reporting period, with networks using Haiti and its territorial waters as corridors to transport narcotics northward through the Caribbean and beyond. The trade in elvers also raised significant concerns, with a poorly regulated and opaque commercial sector remaining highly exposed to illicit activity, exploited by one specific network identified by the Panel.

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* Circulated in the languages of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Introduction

A. Mandate

1. On 17 October 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2794 (2025), in which it renewed the sanctions regime on Haiti, consisting of an arms embargo as well as a travel ban and an asset freeze against individuals and/or entities designated by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti as being responsible for, complicit in or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security and stability of Haiti. Through resolution 2794 (2025), the Council also designated two additional individuals: Dimitri Hérard (HTi.008), the former head of the National Palace General Security Unit, for his support to gangs, and Kempes Sanon (HTi.009), the leader of Les Argentins gang. Currently, the sanctions list includes the names of nine individuals and two entities.¹
2. The Council extended, for a period of 13 months from the date of adoption of resolution 2794 (2025), the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Haiti, as specified in paragraph 21 of resolution 2653 (2022), and further decided that this mandate shall also apply with respect to the measures imposed in resolution 2794 (2025).
3. This report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 2794 (2025) and covers investigations conducted up to 10 July 2026.

B. Methodology

4. The Panel conducts its investigations in a professional and technical manner, adhering to the principles of transparency, objectivity, impartiality and independence. The Panel's working methods are in full conformity with the best practices, as recommended by the Informal Working Group on General Security Council Sanctions Issues (see S/2006/997). The Panel placed particular emphasis on transparency and the use of reliable sources, including documentary evidence, independent verifiable sources and the opportunity to reply (see annex 1). The Panel takes great care not to disclose identifying information, when necessary, in order to protect sources given the extreme levels of insecurity in Haiti.
5. In October 2025, February 2026, and May 2026, the Panel conducted fact-finding missions in Haiti (Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien), in Santo Domingo, and in Miami, United States of America. The Panel is grateful for the support it received from the respective national authorities, as well as from the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the United Nations Support Office in Haiti, the United Nations country team and non-governmental actors on the ground.
6. During its visits to Haiti, the Panel met with representatives of Haitian State institutions, including the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior and Territorial Communities, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Economy and Finance. It also engaged with the leadership of the Haitian National Police and the customs, financial institutions and anti-corruption units, political and private sector actors, as well as representatives of civil society organizations, individuals living in gang-controlled areas, and other victims of gang-related violence, including sexual and gender-based violence. The Panel also met with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of BINUH, and other representatives of BINUH, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

¹ See the narrative summaries of reasons for listing. Available at <https://main.un.org/security/council/en/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries>.

(UNODC) and United Nations humanitarian agencies and diplomats from various missions, as well as the Force Commander of the Gang Suppression Force and other personnel of the Force.

7. The Panel would like to thank those Member States and other entities that have responded to the Panel's official communications (see annex 2). The Panel further emphasizes the critical importance of Member States' timely responses to its requests.

C. Implementation of the sanctions regime

1. Arms embargo

8. The arms embargo continues to be violated on a regular basis. While authorities in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the United States of America have taken steps to prevent trafficking and prosecute traffickers, they remain largely insufficient given the scale of the challenge. Precise estimates of flows remain difficult to establish, but several indicators point to sustained violations. Gangs have maintained their capacity to fight and replenish their stocks of arms and ammunition (see sect. II.C). Haitian authorities intercepted several illicit shipments at ports of entry during the reporting period, having seized none in the period covered in the previous final report ([S/2025/597](#), para. 17). United States authorities intercepted firearms and ammunition destined for Haiti and are investigating and prosecuting a range of trafficking networks.

9. Haitian authorities have cooperated with the Panel and shared information on cases of transnational trafficking. Regarding sources and transit countries, at the time of drafting, the United States was yet to respond to the Panel's tracing requests but provided information about ongoing judicial cases. The Dominican Republic continued to offer positive support to the Panel's investigations. Jamaica responded to the Panel's request for information and The Bahamas requested an extension. The Turks and Caicos Islands, through the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, had not responded at the time of drafting.

2. Asset freeze

10. The Panel notes that very little progress (since that documented in [S/2025/597](#), paras. 13–16) has been made regarding the freezing of assets for individuals under United Nations sanctions. The Panel is concerned about the absence of a national coordinated process to identify and freeze assets of individuals sanctioned by the United Nations, which erodes the impact of the sanctions regime in Haiti (see annex 3).

11. The Panel sent written communication to the Bank of the Republic of Haiti and some commercial banks for an update and was informed that only accounts belonging to Kempes Sanon (HTi.009) and to Prophane Victor (HTi.006) (see also [S/2025/356](#), para. 9), both with very meagre amounts, had been frozen (see annex 3). The limited amount of funds identified and frozen reflects the delayed action of financial institutions following designations, resulting in sanctioned individuals transferring their assets or concealing them under the names of third parties.

12. Haitian commercial banks also stated that they had frozen the bank accounts of several gang leaders following the imposition of either United Nations sanctions or unilateral sanctions on gang leaders and Viv Ansanm (HTe.002). Banks added that they had also blacklisted anyone they identified as being associated with or supporting gang operations.

13. The Panel contacted several Member States and their territories which were the most likely to hold assets belonging to Haitian sanctioned individuals (see annex 4).

3. Travel ban

14. The Panel did not identify nor did receive any information on attempts to violate the travel ban during the reporting period. However, the Panel is concerned by persistent fraud in the issuance of Haitian passports in the country.² According to Haitian officials, passports are issued in excessive numbers, often with falsified fiscal stamps, thereby enabling the embezzlement of fees and bribery from applicants seeking genuine documents for illicit purposes. Some passports have been issued to foreign nationals and/or under fake names. These shortcomings increase the risk of sanctioned individuals obtaining multiple passports and travelling under false identities to circumvent the travel ban.

D. Evolution of the political and security context

1. Political transition

15. The current mandate of the Panel began during a politically tense transition period marked by significant friction between members of the Transitional Presidential Council and the Prime Minister, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, in the run-up to 7 February 2026, which marked the end of the mandate of the Transitional Presidential Council (S/2026/241, sect. I.C). Ultimately, full executive power was transferred to the Council of Ministers led by the Prime Minister, with strong support from international partners.

16. On 23 February 2026, a National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections was adopted and signed by a range of political, civil society and economic actors, with the aim of creating the security and governance conditions necessary for elections. Subsequently, a reshuffled governmental Cabinet was installed in March. However, five months after its adoption, the implementation of the Pact – particularly regarding the provisions on the restoration of security – remains very slow, further weakening domestic confidence in the transition.

17. Some progress has been recorded in electoral preparations, including the registration of political parties, the adoption of an electoral decree (see para. 18) and an agreement over the electoral budget. Although the authorities announced an updated electoral calendar with the first round scheduled for December, political observers who met with the Panel noted that elections were unlikely to be held in 2026.

Electoral decree

18. On 2 June 2026, the Council of Ministers published a new electoral decree amending the one issued by the Transitional Presidential Council in December 2025.³

19. Although the decree introduces new provisions, it maintains the prohibition on United Nations-sanctioned individuals from running for presidential, legislative and/or local elections or serving in Provisional Electoral Council-related structures organizing the elections. The impact of this provision is likely to be very limited, as

² Several investigations are currently being conducted by the Central Directorate of the Criminal Investigation Police (Direction centrale de la police judiciaire – DCPJ). Interviews with Haitian officials, May 2026.

³ See https://cephaiti.ht/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Decret_electoral_-1e-Decembre-2025.pdf.

the vast majority of those involved in supporting gangs and destabilizing the country have yet to be designated.

2. Security situation

20. After years of instability and given the absence of effective governing structures, gangs have continued to fill the governance void in parts of the West, Artibonite and Centre Departments, while trying to extend their influence in other departments. The intensification of security operations by the Haitian authorities has resulted in the recovery of some areas from gang control in the capital. However, gains remain fragile and national roads connecting the capital to the rest of the country remain under gang control (see sect. II.A.1). The situation in the lower Artibonite also worsened considerably, as increasingly powerful gangs carried out attacks of exceptional brutality (see sect. II.A.4).

21. Beyond the impact of security operations, which have resulted in significant civilian casualties, the population has also suffered severe consequences of gang attacks and infighting, particularly in the capital and in the Artibonite Department. After holding together for more than two years, there were violent fractures in the Viv Ansanm gang alliance during the reporting period (see sect. II.A.2).

22. The scale of security challenges, combined with the limited capacity of national institutions, has resulted in a fragmented security response with a proliferation of armed actors. On the one hand, the Government's security approach is relying heavily on international actors, including a private security contractor and the Gang Suppression Force. On the other hand, the population is increasingly turning to self-defence groups, Haitian private security companies and the Protected Areas Security Brigade (S/2024/704, annex 26) to fill the security vacuum. For some of these actors, the unstable security situation has become a business opportunity.

23. While some of these security actors operate within a recognized legal framework, others function outside any formal oversight mechanism, with the result that the absence of accountability contributes to impunity and fails to prevent further human rights violations (see sect. II.B).

(a) National security and defence forces

24. The absence of a national security strategy hampers a comprehensive approach to fighting gangs, the prioritization of objectives and the management of resources.

25. Although security operations appear more coordinated and bolstered by increased logistical capacities (S/2026/241, para. 17), the Haitian National Police continues to face the same challenges previously reported by the Panel: an insufficient number of personnel, limited equipment, human rights abuses and corruption issues (see annex 5).

26. The reporting period was marked by a shift in the approach to the national armed forces. The Government committed to rebuilding the Haitian Armed Forces, following years of limited institutional support since their remobilization in 2017. Concrete steps being taken include recruitment, procurement of equipment, training programmes and the project to develop a new military doctrine.⁴ Despite slow progress, the Haitian Armed Forces have become more involved in security operations in support of the Haitian National Police.

⁴ Interview with representative of Ministry of Defence, May 2026.

(b) International private contractors

27. The Government has recently extended by a year the contract of the international private military company in charge of supporting security operations through helicopter support, drone strikes and ground engagement ([S/2025/597](#), para. 28).⁵ The task force, of which the contractors are part, has expanded its area of operations to the lower Artibonite since April 2026.

28. The reporting period also saw the privatization of security support extending beyond the fight against gangs to border control. The Government signed a 10-year contract with an international company for border security reinforcement and customs revenue optimization.⁶ The company is remunerated through a percentage of Haitian customs revenue, which is the country's second largest source of revenue. The deal has drawn criticism from many Haitian stakeholders, raising concerns about national sovereignty and the substantial revenues the company stands to collect during the contract. Notably, this company and the one mentioned in the paragraph above share the same leadership.

(c) Transition from Multinational Security Support Mission to Gang Suppression Force

29. During the reporting period, the Multinational Security Support Mission transitioned into the Gang Suppression Force and in April 2026, the Kenyan personnel of the Multinational Security Support Mission (and subsequently, the Gang Suppression Force) departed. While the participation of the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haitian National Police operations and its presence in the lower Artibonite had some deterrent effects on gang activity,⁷ the general security situation continued to deteriorate, notwithstanding their presence in the country.

30. The new troops of the Gang Suppression Force began their gradual deployment to Haiti in April 2026, conducting their first operational activities in Port-au-Prince in June 2026. The Gang Suppression Force made its first arrests in mid-June and transferred individuals to the Haitian National Police, which created challenges for the police and the judicial system with respect to absorbing the likely high number of upcoming cases. The Gang Suppression Force seized several firearms and ammunition in July (see para. 117).

(d) Haitian private security companies

31. With more than 100 registered private security companies and many more operating without a licence, the sector remains poorly regulated.⁸ Its governance is further complicated by the involvement of former and current senior government officials and officers of the Haitian National Police. The sector represents a major source of employment for the country. Many companies procure arms and ammunition illicitly, including of calibres in excess of domestic limits (see [S/2023/674](#), paras. 110–113, and [S/2024/704](#), para. 41).

(e) Self-defence groups

32. Self-defence groups have continued to strengthen and multiply throughout the reporting period. Interviews with local authorities, residents, Haitian National Police officers and members of these groups themselves suggest that in many areas they are

⁵ Interviews with security sources, May and June 2026.

⁶ Interview with Haitian official, May 2026, and confidential documents.

⁷ Interviews with local authorities and residents, May and June 2026.

⁸ Interviews with a representative of a private security company and officials from the Ministry of the Interior, 2025. Confidential documents.

the only protection against gang attacks. In the West Department, they are often led by or include Haitian National Police officers who reside in the communities they protect; in more rural areas such as the lower Artibonite, several groups have been coordinating closely with Haitian National Police operations as well as some units of the Protected Areas Security Brigade. In this area, members of self-defence groups have particularly suffered from violent retaliation from gangs (see sect. II.A.4). Some self-defence groups have also been implicated in checkpoint extortion and violations of human rights.

33. The Ministry of the Interior has started to register so-called Brigadiers de paix (see annex 11). For the authorities, while formalizing these groups carries risks, leaving them entirely ungoverned carries greater risks. The registration process also aims at building knowledge about their equipment, including firearms, most of which have been obtained illicitly.

II. Information relevant to the implementation of the measures decided in resolutions 2653 (2022) and subsequent resolutions and the potential designation of individuals or entities who may have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threaten the peace, security or stability of Haiti

A. Gang dynamics

1. Gang dynamics amid intensified security operations

34. Since late 2025, security efforts by Haitian authorities have contributed to reducing gang control in areas of the West Department (see annex 5). Estimations suggest a decline in gangs' territorial control to about 70% of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, down from 85% (see [S/2026/241](#)) (see annex 6).⁹

35. Security gains remain fragile. The inability to contain gang leaders is widely seen as a major setback for security operations. This can be partly explained by the gangs' integration into criminal networks that span government and economic sectors, thereby constraining police operations and investigations. Despite the gangs' apparent autonomy, ties persist between gangs and State and private actors – particularly ahead of elections, when territorial control and perceptions of stability are critical.

36. Political drivers have triggered violence in the commune of Kenscoff and the Artibonite Department. They have also shaped gangs' expansion efforts into southern Grande-Anse Department, where Guy Philippe – a former senior police officer who has pursued political ambitions and backed Viv Ansanm ([S/2024/704](#), paras. 31, 52 and annex 6) – met repeatedly with Jean Misnord (a.k.a “Fado”), the third-in-command of the Simon Pelé gang (see annex 7).¹⁰

37. Certain businessmen, as well as serving Haitian police officers, are exploiting the unstable security situation, including road blockades (see annex 8), to generate illicit revenues. Collusion between gangs (e.g., Tokyo, Simon Pelé and Ti Bwa) and Haitian police officers – who supply weapons and enable gang movements – weakens security operations, contributing to gang leaders evading capture.¹¹ Gangs remain structured and resilient, demonstrating adaptability in the face of increasing security

⁹ Interviews with gang analysts, senior police officers and United Nations staff, May and June 2026.

¹⁰ Interviews with confidential sources, February and May 2026.

¹¹ Interviews with confidential sources and individuals with first-hand knowledge of gangs, May and June 2026. Confidential documents, 2024 and 2026.

operations (see annex 9). In the absence of effective follow-up stabilization efforts, they have managed to reoccupy areas that had previously been cleared by security forces, such as Bel-Air, where the Grand Ravine gang is growing in influence¹² (see annex 10).

38. Some gangs have also relocated to evade pressure and generate new income, which for instance contributed to heavy infighting within Viv Ansanm in the Cul-de-Sac plain area (see sect. II.A.2 and annex 12). Operations in downtown Port-au-Prince have driven gangs to its south-western outskirts (see annex 7), where checkpoints have proliferated. In Carrefour commune, where a parallel governance system supports the continued functioning of daily life (S/2025/597, annex 5), gang leaders and other criminals, including Dimitri Hérard (HTi.008), have continued to enjoy freedom. Gangs have used bank agencies in Carrefour for transactions, including ransom payments, amid rising kidnappings.¹³ Besides, gang attacks in Seguin, South-East Department, have marked a significant development in what had heretofore been a relatively safe region.

39. Weak State presence enables gang control over strategic axes linking the capital to the north, the south and to the border with the Dominican Republic, which they use to secure criminal revenues from illegal taxation and trafficking. In the Centre Department, the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs continue to hold sway over strategic towns (S/2025/597, sect. II.A.3) and a former senator has used armed groups to pressure authorities into cutting security efforts.¹⁴ In the North Department, local gangs – some linked with Viv Ansanm – and certain agents of the Protected Areas Security Brigade (S/2024/704, annex 26), under the leadership of Alex Jean-Pierre, have been involved in land spoliation. Agents of the Protected Areas Security Brigade also set up an illegal checkpoint in the locality of Bois d’Anse, Limonade commune, to impose transit fees.¹⁵

40. Amid insecurity and limited State capacity, self-defence groups have proliferated, often supporting the police and the Protected Areas Security Brigade. The Government has begun registering the so-called Brigadiers de Paix and aims to establish a mechanism to regulate and integrate citizen participation in security prevention within an institutional framework (see annex 11). However, many members are involved in criminal activities, remain illegally armed and funded and risk perpetuating cycles of violence by contributing to the next generation of gangs.

2. Fractures within Viv Ansanm alliance

41. Signs of Viv Ansanm fracturing appeared during clashes between gangs in the Cul-de-Sac plain area (see annex 12), and in the Cité Soleil commune of the West Department, during which 613 people were killed (including 214 individuals not associated with gangs) and 375 others were injured (including 139 individuals not associated with gangs), between 6 March and 31 July 2026.¹⁶

42. Clashes in the Cul-de-Sac Plain were motivated by competition over territory and revenue control. Despite some shifts, gangs were divided into two camps. Gangs based in Croix-des-Bouquets – Chen Mechan (led by Claudy Célestin alias “Chen Mechan”), Canaan (led by Jeff Larose alias “Jeff”) and 400 Mawozo (led by Wilson Joseph, alias “Lanmò San Jou” – HTi. 004) – alongside the Tokyo gang (led by Ralph

¹² Interviews with gang analysts and with sources with first-hand knowledge of gang dynamics, May and June 2026, and confidential report, June 2026.

¹³ Interviews with senior police officer and gang analysts, May 2026.

¹⁴ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.

¹⁵ Interview with representative of transport sector, June 2026.

¹⁶ See <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1>.

Woodmyr Louissaint, alias “Chalè”) – confronted gangs in Cité Soleil, including Pierre VI (led by Obama) and Terre Noire (led by Jonel Catel), supported by other gangs such as Boston (led by Mathias Saintil), Belekou (led by James Edmond, a.k.a “Bendji”) and Wharf Jérémie (led by Monel Felix, alias “Micanor”).¹⁷

43. On 20 May 2026, negotiations for a truce began and on 5 June 2026, an agreement was signed by the gangs involved in the clashes – mediators included local businessmen¹⁸ – establishing designated areas of control and a reduction in armed presence.¹⁹ On 25 May 2026, the new Cité Soleil municipal commission was established. At least one of the municipal commissioners is an active member of the Brooklyn gang (led by Gabriel Jean-Pierre, alias “Ti Gabriel”, a key ally of Jeff). The appointment of Brooklyn gang members to positions within the Cité Soleil municipal commission exacerbated rivalries with other gangs, particularly the Belekou gang.²⁰ The Panel is concerned about collusion between some members of local authorities and gangs within public institutions. These ties aim at consolidating territorial control and influencing upcoming elections, also building on Ti Gabriel’s long-standing political connections with a former member of parliament for Cité Soleil.²¹

44. A separate development in Cité Soleil further highlighted fractures within Viv Ansanm. Clashes erupted mid-June between the Wharf Jérémie gang and the Belekou gang and lasted for several weeks. These resulted in deaths, rape (see para. 77), disappearances and punitive killings of gang members, including by their own leaders, underscoring the fragility withing gang leadership structures. On 28 June, at least three members of the Fort Dimanche gang were killed by Belekou gang members while attempting to negotiate a truce between the Belekou and Wharf Jérémie gangs. On 30 June, the Belekou gang leader killed 17 members of his own gang and nine civilians accused of collaborating with the Wharf Jérémie gang in a plot against him.²²

3. Political drivers of violence in Kenscoff commune

45. Over a year and a half since the first large-scale attack by Viv Ansanm against the commune of Kenscoff on 27 January 2025 (S/2025/597, annex 6), the security environment remains fragile. Despite relative calm in its central area, the situation remains critical in hard-to-reach areas, where gangs move freely, re-enter cleared zones, control movement along secondary routes and launch attacks (see annex 13).²³ Between 4 and 9 July 2026, the commune experienced a new wave of violence, as gang attacks across several localities killed at least 61 residents and displaced at least 5,800 people.²⁴ At the time of drafting, violence was escalating.

46. Kenscoff is strategically significant for multiple reasons. It overlooks the commune of Pétiön-Ville, where public and commercial institutions, United Nations offices and embassies are located (see S/2025/597). The commune hosts a critical telecommunication site, the temporary takeover of which by Viv Ansanm in August 2025 disrupted Internet and air traffic-related systems nationwide. Moreover,

¹⁷ Interview with gang analyst, April 2026.

¹⁸ Interviews with residents and civil society representatives working in gang-affected areas, May and June 2026.

¹⁹ Interview with gang analyst, June 2026.

²⁰ Interviews with civil society representatives, May and June 2026. See also <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1>.

²¹ Interviews with confidential sources, May and June 2026.

²² Interviews with residents of Cité Soleil and Wharf Jérémie, gang analysts and an international humanitarian expert, June and July 2026. Confidential note, July 2026.

²³ Interview with local authority and residents, 2025 and 2026.

²⁴ Interview with residents and gang analysts, 2026. See also <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-1001-updates-displacements-following-armed-attacks>.

Kenscoff's role as a key agricultural hub for Port-au-Prince, combined with its location along a strategic corridor to the south, means that violence in the commune poses a serious risk to food supply and mobility.

47. Political motives have shaped the destabilization of Kenscoff. Earlier attacks in January 2025 (S/2025/597, annex 6) were intended to expose police difficulties in securing a major residential area²⁵ and to deliberately create chaos in order to influence public opinion in favour of negotiations with gangs.²⁶ During the reporting period, Kenscoff remained central to political and financial interests, with influential actors backing gangs and other armed actors to control the area.

Alfrédo Antoine and Nenel Cassy as gang sponsors

Alfrédo Junior Antoine

48. Since at least 2016, Alfrédo Junior Antoine, a former member of Parliament elected from the constituency of Kenscoff (2016–2020)²⁷ has armed and supported youth groups in the area as a political tool for his agenda. These groups either subsequently developed into gangs or became affiliated with them. He is also responsible for the kidnapping and illegal detention of individuals, using gangs and other armed individuals to intimidate political opponents or illegally seize property (see annex 14).²⁸

49. Mr. Antoine was one of the main sponsors of the attack on 27 January 2025 in Kenscoff, resulting in over 100 killings, multiple cases of rape – including of minors – robberies and the burning of residential property.²⁹ Since then, gangs have taken over areas of the commune, causing severe unrest among residents. Mr. Antoine was arrested on 4 April 2025 for involvement in conspiracy against State security, financing criminal organizations, complicity in murder and criminal association. He was released on 9 May 2025.³⁰

50. Mr. Antoine planned attacks with gangs in several neighbourhoods of Kenscoff. He communicated frequently with members of Viv Ansanm, including Dady Paul, known as Frantz Valmyr (alias “Didy”), a main gang leader in Kenscoff (see annex 13), and with other gang members. He was also in regular contact with Magalie Habitant – a key intermediary between politicians, businessmen and gangs (see S/2025/597, paras. 78–80 and annex 22) – and had close ties with Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005). Additionally, he was identified as one of the suppliers of firearms, ammunition and financial resources to Viv Ansanm, using an intermediary. Several illicit firearms were also found at his residence.³¹

51. Mr. Antoine has also been involved in murder, breach of trust, dispossession and burglary of private homes. He was previously imprisoned for fraud from 14 September 2005 to 25 April 2008 and was arrested for illegally taking control of property, forgery and the use of forged documents, in July 2015.³² The Panel contacted Mr. Antoine, who denied his connections to gangs, in an email. The Panel shared Mr. Antoine's message with the Committee and stands by its findings.

²⁵ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026. See also: https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/flash_report_20250222_kenscoff-en.pdf.

²⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.

²⁷ See <https://www.haiti-reference.info/pages/plan/politique/pouvoir-legislatif/50eme-legislature/>.

²⁸ Interviews with several victims of Mr. Antoine, 2026.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Confidential investigation report, May 2025 and interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Confidential investigation report, May 2025.

Nenel Cassy

52. Nenel Cassy, a former senator for the Nippes Department (2006–2012³³ and 2016–2020)³⁴, has supported various armed actors to advance his political agenda and interests.

53. Mr. Cassy controls the “BLTS” criminal group,³⁵ operating in Chalon, Miragoâne commune, Nippes Department, which is specialized in the illegal possession of firearms, murder, attempted murder, kidnapping for ransom, collective rape, the hijacking of vehicles and cargo trucks, and armed robbery.³⁶ He contributed to the creation of Fantome 509, a violent group of armed individuals, including police officers, that emerged in 2018.³⁷ Fantome 509 was involved in the disruption of public order, arson and the vandalization of public and private property, and the killing of police officers.³⁸

54. Nenel Cassy and his associates also perpetrated an attempted kidnapping with the subsequent assassination of a Haitian diplomat, in February 2021.³⁹

55. Mr. Cassy sought to foment chaos in Haiti by planning armed attacks against airport infrastructure in Port-au-Prince, Les Cayes and Cap-Haïtien. He organized frequent meetings that led to attacks to destabilize Kenscoff in collusion with Viv Ansanm.⁴⁰

56. Two Member States provided information linking Nenel Cassy to Haitian gangs. These include the distribution of weapons to gangs in Gressier commune, in 2018, and heading the attack against a former senator’s home, in late 2022, with the Ti-Makak gang (dismantled in April 2023, see S/2023/674, paras. 56 and 57 and annex 13), to which he supplied weapons. Nenel Cassy also supported G-Pèp and notably the Kraze Barye gang, led by Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005).⁴¹

57. The release of Nenel Cassy on 19 August 2025, after his arrest on 2 August 2025 for conspiracy against State security, financing of criminal groups, attempted murder and association with criminals,⁴² prompted civil society organizations and other stakeholders to denounce the impunity this case represents.⁴³ Despite official claims that the case is being re-examined,⁴⁴ sources close to the investigation said that the case had been dropped.⁴⁵

58. During his tenure as a senator (2016–2020), Mr. Cassy used his influence to secure the appointment of the two heads of the Office for the Monetization of Development Assistance Programmes (Bureau de monétisation des programmes d’aide au développement), including Patrick Noramé (S/2023/674, annex 47).

³³ See <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/101766/benjamin-au-senat-lavalassien-de-coeur>.

³⁴ See <https://www.haiti-reference.info/pages/plan/politique/pouvoir-legislatif/senat/>.

³⁵ This group is not the counter-narcotics bureau (Bureau de lutte contre le trafic de stupéfiants) of the Haitian National Police.

³⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, February 2026.

³⁷ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026. See also: <https://insightcrime.org/news/disgruntled-police-unrest-haiti/>.

³⁸ Confidential investigation report and confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.

³⁹ Ibid., and interview with police investigator, 2023.

⁴⁰ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and 2026.

⁴¹ Information from Member States, June and July 2023. Interview with representatives of a Member State, June 2023.

⁴² Official Facebook page of the Haitian National Police, 2 August 2025.

⁴³ Interviews with confidential sources, 2025 and confidential report, 2025.

⁴⁴ Interviews with senior government officials, 2026.

⁴⁵ Interviews with confidential sources, 2026. Confidential report, 2025.

Mr. Noramé embezzled and laundered significant amounts of funds, which were partially illegally diverted to Mr. Cassy.⁴⁶

59. Nene Cassy was sanctioned by Canada in March 2023, along with other individuals, with the intention to exert pressure on those who have engaged in significant acts of corruption and have established links to criminal gangs.⁴⁷ In April 2023, he was banned from entering the Dominican Republic on the grounds that he constituted a threat to the country's national security.⁴⁸ In December 2023, the United States sanctioned Mr. Cassy for abusing his public position by participating in corrupt activity that undermined the integrity of the Government of Haiti.⁴⁹ The Panel wrote to Mr. Cassy, giving him an opportunity to respond to its findings, but had received no response at the time of drafting.

4. Massacre by Viv Ansanm in the lower Artibonite

60. March 2026 marked the onset of a new wave of acute violence in the lower Artibonite, driven by coordinated Viv Ansanm attacks across dozens of localities. Between 29 March and 3 April 2026, the gangs of Gran Grif (HTe.001, led by Luckson Elan, HTi.007), Kokorat San Ras (led by Bendjy) and Canaan (led by Jeff) perpetrated multiple attacks against Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Marchand Dessalines and Montrouis communes, resulting in at least 95 residents killed and 38 others injured⁵⁰ (see annex 15).

61. Kenken (alias "chat 2 pye"), an important member of Gran Grif, was one of the main coordinators of the attacks. Kenken was previously a member of the Lower Artibonite Coalition,⁵¹ which regroups close to 30 self-defence groups across the Artibonite Department in a collective effort to counter gangs.⁵² He switched sides to join the gang in late October 2025. The attacks were intended to eliminate self-defence groups, notably the Coalition des révolutionnaires pour sauver l'Artibonite (known as the Jean Denis coalition), based in the locality of Jean Denis (Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite commune) and led by Francky Pierre, alias "Ti Mèpri".⁵³

62. As the country's second-largest electoral district, Artibonite's political dynamics have contributed to sustaining violence, notably through the historic use of gangs by Youri Latortue and Prophane Victor (HTi.006).⁵⁴ After the launch of security operations against the Kokorat San Ras stronghold in L'Estère commune in May, its leader, Bendjy, denounced Youri Latortue as the founder of the gang, which the latter now seeks to destroy.⁵⁵

63. Sources warned that, ahead of elections, these individuals may exploit ties to gangs to mobilize support, intimidate rivals and undermine stability.⁵⁶ They also

⁴⁶ Information shared by two Member States and a government official, November 2023 and January 2026.

⁴⁷ See <https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2023/2023-04-12/html/sor-dors56-eng.html> and <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2022-226/FullText.html>.

⁴⁸ Official communication from Member State, 4 February 2026. See also <https://presidencia.gob.do/noticias/presidente-abinader-instruye-al-director-de-migracion-impedir-entrada-al-pais-extranjeros>.

⁴⁹ See <https://2021-2025.state.gov/leveraging-tools-to-promote-accountability-and-counter-global-corruption/>.

⁵⁰ Confidential report, April 2026.

⁵¹ Interviews with residents in Artibonite, and with gang analyst, April and June 2026.

⁵² Interviews with individual with direct experience in gang-controlled areas in Artibonite, and with gang analyst, April 2026.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Interviews with residents, gang analysts and government official, May 2026.

⁵⁵ Audio shared with the Panel in May 2026.

⁵⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, April and May 2026.

cautioned that self-defence groups linked to local political dynamics could be used as tools of intimidation, underscoring the need for mechanisms to prevent further destabilization.

B. Acts that violate international human rights law or that constitute human rights abuses, and challenges to the rule of law

64. Between October 2025 and April 2026, 3,165 people were killed and 1,551 injured as a result of armed violence.⁵⁷ While 30% of casualties resulted from gang attacks and 5% from self-defence groups or mob justice, most of them, 65%, occurred during security operations. The overwhelming majority of casualties were caused by firearms.

65. Recent waves of gang violence in Port-au-Prince and the Artibonite Department have brought the number of internally displaced persons in Haiti to 1.5 million, representing approximately 12% of the population.⁵⁸ Displacement, in turn, heightens vulnerability and increases exposure to human rights violations and abuses. Of equal concern is the number of Haitian nationals who continue to be forcibly returned from neighbouring countries, which further deepens the existing humanitarian crisis.⁵⁹

1. Human rights abuses by gangs

66. Designated gangs and gang leaders have continued to commit severe human rights abuses, including killings, sexual and gender-based violence, kidnapping for ransom (see sect. II.E), forced recruitment, destruction of property and extortion. The Panel regularly receives evidence of such abuses in the West, Artibonite and Centre Departments (see annexes 12, 13 and 15). Beyond sanctioned individuals, many other gang leaders continue to engage in actions that meet designation criteria.

(a) West Department

67. In addition to attacks against populations and governmental entities, the Panel notes a resurgence of serious human rights abuses in the context of gang infighting in the West Department. As Viv Ansanm gangs clashed, civilian populations in opposing gang-controlled neighbourhoods, as well as individuals reportedly working for or linked to rival gangs, have been directly targeted. The burning of homes, kidnappings and sexual and gender-based violence have been used as weapons of retaliation.

68. For instance, infighting in the Cul-de-Sac plain between March and May 2026 saw two rival gang coalitions clash (see sect. II.A.1 and annex 12). Over the course of two months, violence killed close to 400 people, including at least 68 civilians, and injured many more, with properties destroyed and 18,000 people displaced. Cases of sexual violence surged (see para. 76).

69. In other gang-controlled areas in the West Department, gangs continue to commit a range of human rights abuses (see sect. II.A), including against members of their own communities. For instance, in 2026, Christ-Roy Chery, alias Chrisla, the leader of the Ti Bwa gang, has continued to administer cruel punishment as part of arbitrary “justice” (S/2025/597, annex 5), shooting individuals in the hands and feet

⁵⁷ See United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), quarterly reports on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025 and January–March 2026.

⁵⁸ See <https://www.iom.int/news/haitis-displacement-crisis-hits-record-15-million-amid-escalating-violence>. The Panel visited two sites for internally displaced persons during the reporting period.

⁵⁹ More than 270,000 people were forcibly returned in 2025. See also S/2026/325, para. 58.

on several occasions in Carrefour.⁶⁰ On 20 December 2025, members of the Simon Pelé gang, led by Stevenson Albert, alias “Djouma”, killed one minor, aged 17, and one 20-year old man for refusing to comply with Djouma’s orders.⁶¹ Since the massacre he ordered in December 2024, Monel Felix, alias Micanor, the leader of Wharf Jéréemie, has continued to instil terror in his neighbourhood, killing individuals and preventing wounded local residents from leaving the neighbourhood to seek medical care.⁶²

(b) Artibonite Department

70. The lower Artibonite has experienced an unprecedented level of coordinated gang violence since late March 2026, with Gran Grif (HTe.001), Kokorat San Ras and Canaan gangs having killed more than 100 people between 29 March and 13 April 2026 (see sect. II.A.4 and annex 15). Witnesses of the attacks reported to the Panel how civilians, including children, were indiscriminately fired upon, and houses were set on fire, leading to significant numbers displaced in very difficult conditions.⁶³

71. Since the death of his brother, Ferdens Tilus (alias “Meyer”), in July 2025, Bendjy has taken the lead of the Kokorat San Ras gang. Bendjy, in coordination with Luckson Elan (HTi.007), the leader of Gran Grif (HTe.001) and Kenken (see sect. II.A.4), planned and conducted the recent wave of attacks launched in March in the lower Artibonite.

(c) Recruitment of children

72. The recruitment of children by gangs in Haiti continued to rise at an alarming rate during the reporting period.⁶⁴ Although the exact number of children within gangs is difficult to estimate, a severe uptick in recruitment, in both West and Artibonite Departments, has been reported to the Panel by residents and civil society representatives working in gang-controlled areas, as well as by officers involved in security operations.

73. Most United Nations -sanctioned gang leaders have continued to recruit minors. Casualties among gang members, sustained as a result of security operations during the reporting period triggered an increase in child recruitment, especially by 5 Segond, led by Johnson André (alias “Izo”) (HTi.002) and Grand Ravine, led by Renel Destina (alias “Ti Lapli”) (HTi.003). Gang leaders have also used children to shield themselves from drone attacks.⁶⁵

74. Summary executions of children allegedly associated with gangs have been reported, carried out by security forces and self-defence groups.⁶⁶ As security operations have intensified and the Gang Suppression Force has begun its operations, the situation of children within gangs is a pressing concern. In May 2026, the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reinsertion – reactivated by the National Pact in February (see para. 16) – presented its road map focused on preventing vulnerable children and youth from joining gangs and supporting the

⁶⁰ Interviews with two confidential sources, January 2026. Confidential report, 2026.

⁶¹ Interviews with a confidential source and a human rights defender, January 2026.

⁶² Interviews with a resident of Wharf Jéréemie, and with a representative of civil society, June 2026.

⁶³ Interviews with two relatives of victims from the attacks and two representatives of local authorities who witnessed the attacks, April 2026.

⁶⁴ See https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-02/EN_CHILDREN%20TRAFFICKED%20BY%20GANGS%20RETHINKING%20THE%20RESPONSES.pdf.

⁶⁵ Interviews with security officers and a human right analyst, 2026.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

reinsertion of those leaving gangs.⁶⁷ However, the current lack of meaningful institutional and financial support means that implementation will be slow and challenging.

2. Sexual and gender-based violence

(a) Sexual and gender-based violence committed by gangs

75. Interviews with human rights specialists and medical staff working in different health facilities in Port-au-Prince reported that the number of cases of sexual and gender-based violence had increased since the beginning of 2026. Collective rapes of women and girls by armed men constitute the majority of sexual violence cases treated by the staff in medical facilities with whom the Panel spoke. In Port-au-Prince, Médecins sans frontières treated 2,485 victims of sexual violence from January to May 2026. Of these, 72% had been raped by armed men, and 64% of total cases were gang rape. The vast majority of victims were women and girls, with 16% being minors.⁶⁸ Specific cases of children ages 8, 9 and 10 years old were reported.

76. Amid a resurgence of gang infighting during the reporting period, sexual violence has been used as a weapon of retaliation against women and girls living in neighbourhoods controlled by rival gangs. Many cases of sexual violence were reported during hostilities in the Cul-de-Sac plain in March and April 2026 (see annex 12).⁶⁹ In particular, members of the gangs of 400 Mawozo, led by Lanmò San Jou (HTi.004), Canaan, led by Jeff Larose, Chen Mechan and Tokyo, led by Chalè, have committed series of rapes when invading Duvivier, Sarthe et Terre Noire neighbourhoods⁷⁰ (see also sect. II.A.1).

77. In mid-June 2026, clashes in Cité Soleil between the gangs of Belekou and Wharf Jérémie resulted in kidnappings by the Belekou gang during which more than 10 women from Wharf Jérémie were subjected to sexual violence.⁷¹

(b) Sexual exploitation and abuse by members of the Multinational Security Support Mission

78. According to the report of the Secretary-General on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (A/80/644), in 2025, the United Nations received four allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, including three minors, involving Kenyan personnel from the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti.⁷² All cases were corroborated by investigations conducted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and referred to the commander of the Gang Suppression Force and the Multinational Security Support Mission for investigation and remedial measures.

79. The cases occurred in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, where Kenyan officers had been deployed between the end of 2024 and April 2026. The Panel interviewed several members of local civil society who had met with or supported victims or their

⁶⁷ Commission nationale de désarmement, démantèlement et réinsertion, « Stratégie d'intervention », mars 2026.

⁶⁸ See also BINUH, quarterly reports on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025 and January–March 2026.

⁶⁹ Interview with human right analyst, June 2026. See <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1>.

⁷⁰ Interview with human rights analyst and representative of civil society, June 2026.

⁷¹ Interview with representative of civil society of Cité Soleil, June 2026. Interview with human rights analyst, June 2026.

⁷² See the supplementary information to the report, available at https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/sites/www.un.org.preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/files/smr_2026_a-80-644_supplementary_data.pdf.

families. They confirmed the four cases outlined in the Secretary-General's report and also mentioned additional ones. Several cases included transactions in exchange for money and/or food.

80. Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite has been enduring very high levels of armed violence. While many residents have left the area, those who remain are among the most vulnerable. In this context, the deployment of exclusively male battalions in ordinary residential areas, where civilians have easy access to premises, has fallen short of providing the necessary safeguards to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.

81. In July 2026, the Kenyan authorities informed the Panel that following the allegations, the Multinational Security Support Mission had set up a board of inquiry, which they sent to Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite in September and November 2025. Visits to government institutions, including hospitals and a police station, did not yield information. The board of inquiry concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated. In January 2026, the board of inquiry met with non-governmental organizations and obtained witness statements, which they deemed not sufficiently supported by evidence. The Kenyan authorities informed the Panel that to address the gaps identified by the board of inquiry, a formal national investigation team had recently been established.

3. Excessive use of force by security actors

82. As previously observed by the Panel (see [S/2025/597](#) and [S/2026/241](#)), a consistent trend persists: approximately 70% of persons killed or injured recorded during the first quarter of 2026 occurred during security operations. These operations have included extrajudicial executions involving police personnel.⁷³

(a) Use of explosive drones outside a regulatory human rights framework

83. During the reporting period, security operations in densely populated urban areas continued to be documented involving the use of explosive drones facilitated by a foreign private military company. In the first quarter of 2026 alone, such operations resulted in the deaths of 41 civilians, including 3 boys, and injured 28 civilians, including 2 girls.⁷⁴ Medical professionals interviewed by the Panel in Port-au-Prince also reported civilian victims of drone strikes, including a pregnant woman.⁷⁵ As previously indicated, such use may constitute extrajudicial executions ([S/2025/597](#), annex 8).

(b) Extrajudicial executions

84. In 2025, 125 cases of actual or attempted cases of extrajudicial executions were transmitted by the Human Rights Section of BINUH to the Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police, 17 of which have been completed and the rest remaining under investigation.⁷⁶

85. The Panel has been looking into a range of illicit activities conducted by officers of the Departmental Law Enforcement Unit (Unité départementale de maintien de l'ordre – UDMO) of the Haitian National Police in the Artibonite Department, including the diversion of ammunition from Haitian National Police stockpiles, support for the spoliation of land and collusion with gang members (see annex 19). The Inspectorate General is currently investigating these reports, as well as the

⁷³ BINUH, quarterly reports on the human rights situation in Haiti, October–December 2025 and January–March 2026.

⁷⁴ See <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/AMR36/0991/2026/es/>.

⁷⁵ Interviews with medical staff, 2026.

⁷⁶ BINUH, quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, January–March 2026.

involvement of one officer of the Departmental Law Enforcement Unit (UDMO) in several extrajudicial killings in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite.⁷⁷ These include the assassination of several individuals, including a 14-year-old girl, between September 2025 and March 2026.⁷⁸

4. Human cost of armed violence and obstruction of humanitarian access and assistance

86. In 2025, 5,915 people were killed and 2,708 injured⁷⁹ as a result of gang-related violence, with the human cost of armed violence extending well beyond immediate casualties. The general increase in firearm calibres on the battlefield (see para. 94), coupled with greater circulation of large-capacity magazines contributed to higher lethality of armed violence. In addition, injuries require surgery more frequently and extended hospital stays.⁸⁰ Deaths and long-term disabilities remove breadwinners from households, deepen poverty and further erode the social fabric of vulnerable communities.⁸¹

87. Beyond the individual toll, the cumulative impact of armed violence on the health system is significant. Access to care remains deeply challenging due to gang control of roads and the repeated temporary suspension or definitive closure of many facilities as a result of violence. Only 10% of health facilities with hospitalization capacity are fully operational nationwide.⁸²

5. Challenges to the rule of law and human rights protection

88. On 27 May 2026, two specialized judicial units – one addressing mass crimes and sexual violence, the other tackling complex financial crimes – were inaugurated.⁸³ That development presents an important opportunity to address impunity in these critical areas.

89. However, several decisions have been undermining the rule of law and reinforcing impunity (S/2026/241, annex 12). In particular, on 17 December 2025, a decree created a High Court of Justice with exclusive authority to prosecute and adjudicate current and former senior State officials for any criminal acts committed during their time in office. In practice, it removed ordinary courts' jurisdiction and introduced complex procedures widely seen as making prosecutions and adjudication impossible and shielding officials from accountability. In addition, legal experts have raised concerns over the suspension of many ongoing cases before the judiciary, at a time when the High Court cannot be operational in the absence of an elected Parliament.⁸⁴

C. Arms trafficking and violations of the arms embargo

90. Successive waves of intense armed violence over the reporting period reflect the continued ability and ease of gangs and other non-State armed actors to acquire firearms and, more critically, ammunition. While Haitian, Dominican and United

⁷⁷ Meeting with a representative of the Inspectorate General of the Haitian National Police, May 2026.

⁷⁸ Confidential report, 2026.

⁷⁹ BINUH, quarterly report on the human rights situation in Haiti, October-December 2025.

⁸⁰ Interview with medical staff and Haitian National Police officers, June 2026.

⁸¹ See Caribbean Community Implementation Agency for Crime and Security and others, *Pathway to Policy: Firearms Trafficking and Public Health in the Caribbean* (December 2025).

⁸² See S/2026/325.

⁸³ See <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/06/1167627>.

⁸⁴ Interviews with judicial sources and legal analysts, May and June 2026.

States authorities have taken steps to address trafficking and implement the arms embargo, these efforts remain insufficient given the scale of the challenge.

91. Most of the trafficking networks operating between the United States and Haiti investigated by the Panel during the mandate are efficient, but not particularly sophisticated. Yet they display a striking degree of confidence and take few measures to cover their tracks. Their operations are characterized by poor concealment methods, the inclusion of easily detectable contraband, such as cannabis, alongside the firearms and, in some cases, the presence of documents inside the shipments clearly identifying the traffickers themselves (see para. 103). Most of the individuals involved in trafficking from the United States and investigated by the Panel purchased firearms under their own names from federal firearms licensees, leaving a clear paper trail of their criminal activities.

92. Taken together, these indicators point to a perception of low risk among traffickers of the likelihood of interdiction. The Panel is concerned about the weaknesses and gaps in inspection and enforcement mechanisms in both the United States and Haiti, as well as the complicity of corrupt Haitian customs and law enforcement officials in facilitating the movement of illicit shipments by air and sea.

93. Although no violation of the arms embargo was reported by Haitian and Dominican authorities along the land border during the reporting period, the Panel received information indicating that Haitian non-State armed actors continue to procure materiel through cross-border networks. These networks acquire materiel in the Dominican Republic, with Belladère remaining a particularly vulnerable point.

1. Trends in trafficking

(a) Evolution of calibres and types of firearms

94. Since its establishment in October 2022, the Panel has noted a clear shift in the calibre of firearms used by gangs. Artisanal weapons and revolvers have been increasingly relegated to rural areas, smaller criminal groups and individuals, while 5.56x45mm semi-automatic rifles have replaced shotguns among gangs and complemented handguns. Over the past two years, gangs have been procuring growing quantities of 7.62x39mm rifles and, to a lesser extent, 7.62x51mm calibre firearms, resulting in higher lethality (see sect. II.B). The most sought-after firearms are currently .50 calibre rifles, which, while still circulating in limited quantities, are already present within certain gangs. During the reporting period, privately made firearms were also documented as part of arms embargo violations, reflecting a developing trend as previously reported by the Panel (see annex 17, see also [S/2024/704](#)).

(b) Sources of illicit ammunition

95. During the reporting period, the Panel documented a sample of 1,200 rounds of seized ammunition. The ammunition was retrieved from gangs operating in Kenscoff, Croix-des-Bouquets, Delmas 2 and Bel-Air between October 2025 and June 2026. These include 5.56x45mm (59.5%), .223 Remington (3.2%), 7.62x39mm (6%), 7.62x51mm (27%), .308 Winchester (1.5%), and 12.7x99mm/.50cal (2.8%). Ammunition was produced by more than 30 different manufacturers across 20 countries, including in Europe, Asia and the Americas, which export for a wide commercial and military or law enforcement market. A notable portion of seized ammunition come from national stockpiles, primarily Haitian, but also Dominican (see annex 18).

(c) Prices

96. Arms and ammunition trafficking continue to be a very lucrative business. Prices on the illicit Haitian market remain high, particularly in Port-au-Prince, reflecting the sustained demand from non-State armed actors across the country ([S/2025/597](#), para. 76). Notably, prices in the lower Artibonite region have converged with those in Port-au-Prince. Basic 9x19mm handguns sell for between \$2,000 and \$4,000, while 5.56x45mm semi-automatic rifles fetch between \$5,000 and \$8,000. Ammunition prices are equally elevated, with a single 5.56x45mm round selling for approximately \$3.⁸⁵

(d) Use of messaging applications

97. Encrypted messaging applications play a central role in the international trafficking of arms and ammunition in Haiti, serving both to connect individuals along the trafficking chain and as marketplaces where traffickers manage communities of potential buyers. For instance, in 2025 the Panel received information about a messaging application group entitled “Weapons market”. The group was administered at the time by an individual with a number registered in France who displayed firearms for sale, mostly second-hand, including handguns and semi-automatic rifles. The group administrator claimed the network was able to deliver anywhere. Telephone numbers of potential buyers were registered in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, as well as in regional overseas local authorities and departments of France: Guadeloupe, French Guiana and Martinique. The Panel sent a request for information to the French authorities in 2025, who responded that the matter was under investigation.

(e) Trafficking of firearms from Haiti to Jamaica

98. In July 2026, the Jamaican authorities informed the Panel that the drugs-for-guns trade remains one of the primary sources of illicit firearms acquired by criminal gangs operating in Jamaica ([S/2024/704](#), sects. II.B.1 (a) (iv) and II.B.2 (a) (i)). Jamaican records indicate a slight reduction in the frequency of trafficking voyages, due to sustained operational pressure by regional and Jamaican security agencies, and the passage of Hurricane Melissa, in late 2025, which damaged the marijuana cultivation area in Jamaica. Since the previous report of the Panel ([S/2025/597](#), annex 27), the Jamaican authorities have seized three additional firearms bearing the markings of the Haitian National Police, bringing the total number of seized Haitian National Police firearms in Jamaica to date to 51.

2. Progress and challenges in the enforcement of the arms embargo**(a) Haiti**

99. During the reporting period, Haitian authorities, in compliance with the arms embargo, have seized several shipments of illegal arms and ammunition concealed in containers coming from the United States. These include interceptions at ports of entry in Cap-Haïtien, North Department, and Saint-Marc, Artibonite Department (see annex 16). While traffickers were arrested and some investigations were launched, limited resources, pervasive corruption and the absence of effective protection for officers willing to act, consistently prevent meaningful judicial outcomes.

100. In most cases of violations previously reported by the Panel, suspects have been released despite overwhelming evidence, investigations have been derailed by pressure from influential actors, and no prosecutions have ever resulted in any charges

⁸⁵ Interviews with security officers, 2026 and information retrieved from phone exploitation of arms traffickers, 2026.

(see for instance [S/2025/597](#), para. 83 and para. 101). Against this backdrop, extradition to the United States of individuals suspected of being involved in arms trafficking from its territory has emerged as one of the avenues through which traffickers have faced meaningful consequences. Several cases occurred during the reporting period (see paras. 103 and 104).

101. The Panel previously reported the arrest in the Dominican Republic in June 2025 of three individuals involved in the procurement of arms, commercial drones⁸⁶ and other items for Haitian gang leaders. Étienne Roudley, Sony Pierre and Sténio Saint-Fleur were transferred to the Haitian authorities on 7 June 2025 in Dajabón ([S/2025/597](#), annex 21).⁸⁷ The three were intending to procure a DJI Mavic 3 drone from a shop in Santo Domingo for Johnson André (alias Izo). The trafficking process for this item helps illustrate the broader *modus operandi*. Despite overwhelming evidence, all three individuals were released by the Haitian authorities. Investigations indicate that Mr. Roudley had been in regular contact with Izo for two years, supplying him with various items. Mr. Roudley was in touch with more than 30 senior members of Viv Ansanm negotiating the purchase of clothing, shoes, drones and firearms sourced in the Dominican Republic. He has been using Dominican bank accounts to receive the money.

(b) United States of America

Interdictions

102. During the reporting period, United States Customs and Border Protection seized rifles and ammunition destined to Haiti at ports of exit in the United States. Investigations are ongoing.

Prosecutions of traffickers

103. In December 2025 and January 2026, a series of seizures of handguns, semi-automatic rifles and ammunition were made from maritime containers shipped from the United States in Cap-Haïtien. Clement Mary Junior Thelusma, a dual United States-Haitian national, was arrested in Cap-Haïtien on 29 December 2025 ([S/2026/241](#), annex 13). One of the intercepted shipments included two of his expired Haitian passports. Thelusma has a record of purchasing a significant number of firearms in the United States, regularly shipping small quantities to Haiti and travelling to Cap-Haïtien to receive the merchandise. During questioning by national authorities, he stated that he sold to any buyer for commercial purposes, including to the Jean Denis coalition (see sect. II.A.4). In April 2026, he was extradited to the United States, where he has since been indicted along with an accomplice who purchased firearms for him.⁸⁸

104. The Panel previously reported on the significant seizure in February 2025, in the Dominican Republic, of a container shipped from the United States and destined to Haiti, transporting 23 firearms and 36,000 rounds of ammunition (see [S/2025/597](#), para. 99 and annex 23). The intended end users were the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs. Several individuals were arrested in Haiti, including Jeff Pierre, Jacques Jerry Pierre and Francesca Charles, a dual United States-Haitian national. The three individuals purchased at least 46 firearms between May 2024 and February 2025,

⁸⁶ Gangs have continued to try to procure commercial uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct surveillance and guide operations. During the reporting period, Haitian customs seized 40 UAVs at ports of entry as a preventive measure. Source: Haitian customs, 2026. See also [S/2025/597](#), annex 21.

⁸⁷ Interviews with Dominican and Haitian law enforcement officers, 2025 and 2026 and confidential report, 2026.

⁸⁸ *USA v. Emmanes Tarius and Clement Mary Thelusma Jr.* indictment, filed 26 March 2026.

including two .50 calibre anti-materiel rifles, and sent several shipments to Haiti in violation of the arms embargo. The three individuals were extradited to the United States in December 2025 and in January 2026, they were indicted for conspiring to smuggle and unlawfully ship firearms and ammunition from the United States to Haiti.⁸⁹ One of the key actors of the network, Marcadieu Nabon Pierre, alias “Ti Nana”, the mother of Jeff Pierre and Jacques Jerry Pierre, resides in Haiti and remains at large.

(c) Dominican Republic

105. The Dominican Republic has not formally identified any violations of the arms embargo through its territory during the reporting period.

106. In 2026, the Panel documented several types of ammunition that had been diverted from Dominican national stockpiles, particularly in use by the 400 Mawozo gang, established near the Dominican border (see annex 18). The Panel contacted the authorities, who responded that, in December 2025, a second lieutenant from the Dominican Army had been arrested in San Juan de la Maguana Province, Dominican Republic, along with a Haitian national, while transporting 1,516 rounds of ammunition on a motorbike.⁹⁰ The prosecution of the case is ongoing. The Panel requested additional information on potential other points of diversion.

3. Arms and ammunition trafficking to non-State armed actors in the Artibonite Department

107. Given the surge in armed violence in the Artibonite Department during the reporting period (see sect. II.A.4), the Panel has particularly focused its investigations on trafficking dynamics affecting this region. This escalation was sustained by the capacity of non-State armed actors – both self-defence groups and gangs – to procure arms and ammunition through multiple trafficking channels. Trafficking networks often operate with commercial objectives, supplying materiel indiscriminately to both gangs and other actors. Sources of supply include networks procuring materiel from abroad and domestic transfers, including inter-gang transfers and diversions from the Haitian National Police (see annex 19).

(a) Acquisition of materiel by self-defence groups

108. Self-defence groups in the lower Artibonite, while considerably less equipped than the gangs they oppose, have increasingly managed to procure materiel. Financial contributions from the local population – sometimes collected forcibly at checkpoints – and from the diaspora are used to purchase arms and ammunition from traffickers based outside the region, particularly in Cap-Haïtien and the Centre Department, as well as from abroad (see para. 103). Some groups were also given ammunition by Haitian National Police officers with whom they collaborate in operations against gangs as well as some firearms that some Haitian National Police officers had seized from gangs⁹¹ (see annex 19).

(b) Acquisition of materiel by gangs

109. The Panel previously provided evidence to the Committee on the backing of gangs of the Artibonite Department by businessmen and political actors from the region. While Prophane Victor (HTi.006) had contributed to the rise of Gran Grif,

⁸⁹ Information provided by the United States, July 2026. See also <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/jacksonville-woman-pleads-guilty-unlawfully-smuggling-firearms-united-states-haiti>.

⁹⁰ Official communication from authorities of the Dominican Republic, March 2026.

⁹¹ Interviews with members of self-defence groups and security officers, 2026.

including through the provision of arms, Youri Latortue had supported the Raboteau and the Kokorat San Ras gangs, including by providing arms and ammunition.

110. During the reporting period, both Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras gangs have regularly displayed new materiel, pointing to a combination of direct supply from traffickers based abroad, inter-gang transfers – particularly from the Canaan gang led by Jeff Larose – and diversions from Haitian National Police stockpiles. The latter result from battlefield losses following police casualties, as well as theft by some corrupt police officers. The Panel investigated a network of officers of the Departmental Law Enforcement Unit (UDMO) selling ammunition to gangs, primarily operating out of the Pat-Chawal commissariat, Saint-Marc commune (see annex 19).

4. Diversions from national stockpiles through loss or theft

111. Diversions from Haitian National Police stockpiles remain a persistent concern, as previously reported by the Panel ([S/2025/597](#), annex 25), with ammunition in use by the police consistently found across gang stockpiles and firearms used by the police regularly retrieved from gang members.⁹² For instance, of the 336 7.62x51mm rounds documented by the Panel from seizures from Jamesley and Krache Dife gangs in 2026, 70% had been diverted from the Haitian National Police stockpiles.

112. While some materiel was lost during clashes or following attacks on the Haitian National Police, other cases point to trafficking. The police arrested several corrupt officers during the reporting period, including some found to be trafficking arms and ammunition for Chalè, the leader of the Tokyo gang (see annex 9). Despite these efforts, diversions continue, with some officers collecting unused ammunition and reselling it to gangs, self-defence groups, private security companies and individuals seeking protection.

113. The Panel documented boxes and ammunition of 5.56x45mm ammunition used by gangs and one self-defence group that are consistent with ammunition recently imported by the Haitian Armed Forces (see [S/2026/241](#)).⁹³ In May 2026, the Panel raised the issue with the Haitian Ministry of Defence. Although the chain of custody of the ammunition is unclear, the Panel was informed that a portion of the ammunition imported by the Haitian Armed Forces had been transferred to the Haitian National Police.

114. With the intensification of security operations, the Haitian National Police has been seizing arms and ammunition on a regular basis. In 2025, the police seized 356 firearms, including 132 rifles, 165 pistols (and 9 revolvers), 33 artisanal firearms and 17 shotguns.⁹⁴ In the absence of a central process to manage the seizures, many arms and ammunition are unaccounted for, with some being diverted by corrupt officers.

5. Management of Multinational Security Support Mission and Gang Suppression Force arms and ammunition

115. In paragraph 14 of its resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), the Security Council called upon the Multinational Security Support Mission to implement weapons and ammunition management processes and to report to the Panel any diversion of weapons and ammunition, including through theft and loss. In this connection, the Panel wrote to

⁹² For example, in November 2025, several handguns belonging to the police were retrieved in Croix-des Bouquets from 400 Mawozo. Source: Haitian National Police, 2026.

⁹³ Following a tracing request sent by the Panel, the Brazilian authorities confirmed that the ammunition was consistent with that produced by the Companhia Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC) and that the Haitian Armed Forces had signed a contract with the company in 2023 to import that ammunition.

⁹⁴ Haitian National Police, 2026.

the Kenyan authorities to obtain information on any diversion of arms and ammunition that may have occurred during the deployment in Haiti, including with regard to a small sample of Kenyan-manufactured ammunition retrieved from gangs that the Panel documented. The Kenyan authorities provided detailed information about incidents of diversion, including losses (see annex 20).

116. During its meeting with the Force Commander of the Gang Suppression Force in May 2026, the Panel discussed the management of arms and ammunition of Force contingents and the risks of diversion, as well as the management of the materiel that will be seized during operations. In response, the Force Commander mentioned that an ordnance and weapons and ammunition management officer would be integrated into the headquarters staff of the Force.

117. During operations on 6 July 2026, the Gang Suppression Force seized four 12-gauge shotguns, one 9x19mm sub-machine gun and one semi-automatic 5.56x45mm rifle, as well as magazines and 19 rounds of ammunition, in the Tabarre area of Port-au-Prince, and provided all relevant details to the Panel.

D. Drug trafficking

118. During the reporting period, the Panel investigated record cases of cocaine and cannabis seizures, highlighting the scale of trafficking operations transiting through Haiti. Northern Haiti continues to feature as a corridor in regional drug trafficking routes, as reported by the Panel (see [S/2025/597](#)), with increased participation of nationals of Jamaica and The Bahamas.

1. Seizure by Haitian authorities of 1,045 kg of cocaine, near Tortuga Island

119. On 13 July 2025, the Haitian National Police conducted a major maritime interdiction off Tortuga Island, in the North-West Department, resulting in the seizure of 1,045 kg of cocaine. The operation led to the arrests of one Jamaican national and one Bahamian national, who later died, including one in unclear circumstances. Two other drug traffickers fell into the sea.

120. Information from a Member State indicated that the shipment originated from the coastal areas of Buritaca, in the Department of Magdalena, in Colombia, where the criminal group Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada operates.⁹⁵

121. The current top leaders of Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada are Fredy Castillo Carrillo (alias “Pinocho”) and Naín Andrés Pérez Toncel (alias “Naim”). In 2011, Pinocho was deported to Colombia after serving a sentence in the United States, where he was extradited to face charges of drug trafficking. Similarly, in 2022, he was arrested in Spain and later extradited to Colombia to face new charges, including murder and criminal conspiracy. In June 2023, he was released after a controversial court ruling, although that decision was later overturned.⁹⁶

122. On 28 August 2024, the Government of Colombia suspended the arrest warrants for key leaders of Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada members, including Pinocho, to allow them to participate in the peace talks with the national Government.⁹⁷ As for Naim, he is a high-profile target wanted for homicide and major criminal offences in the Caribbean region.⁹⁸ At present, 45 investigations are under way regarding Autodefensas Conquistadoras de la Sierra Nevada, involving 584

⁹⁵ Information provided by a Member State, April 2026.

⁹⁶ See <https://insightcrime.org/es/noticias-crimen-organizado-colombia/los-pachenca/>.

⁹⁷ República de Colombia, Presidencia de la República, Resolución número 335, 28 de Agosto de 2024.

⁹⁸ See <https://www.policia.gov.co/contenido/nain-andres-perez-toncel>.

suspects across six departments and twenty-four municipalities nationwide, for offences including targeted killings, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, forced recruitment, extortion and kidnapping.⁹⁹

123. According to the Member State, the criminal organization outsourced specific parts of the trafficking operation to external criminal groups. This initially involved launch platforms for go-fast boats fitted with hidden compartments. To ensure the autonomy of these vessels en route to the United States, the organization used support boats on the high seas to refuel, resupply and relieve the crew.¹⁰⁰ The authorities also stated that transnational criminal organizations used distinctive labels bearing counterfeit logos of luxury brands, such as “Cartier” and “Rolex”, encountered in the seized shipment, including to indicate the purity and authenticity of the alkaloid to international buyers. The seized cocaine shipment is estimated to represent a financial loss of approximately \$34 million for the criminal organization, based on market prices in the United States.¹⁰¹ According to security sources, the owner of the drug shipment is believed to be a Bahamian national.¹⁰²

124. Investigations by Haitian authorities are ongoing, including the analysis of data extracted from the seized satellite phone and SIM cards seized from the traffickers. The Panel sent communications to Jamaica and The Bahamas.

2. Seizure by Belgian authorities of 1,156.42 kg of cocaine, in the port of Antwerp¹⁰³

125. On 14 July 2025 – the day after the seizure of 1,045 kg near Tortuga Island – a container was shipped from Cap-Haïtien, in the North Department, transhipped in Kingston, Jamaica, and arrived at the Belgian port of Antwerp, on 22 August 2025. Belgian authorities found 1,156.42 kg of cocaine inside the container, divided into 1,000 packages.

126. According to the Belgian authorities, the drugs were concealed using the “rip-off” method, whereby illicit substances are introduced into legitimate cargo, frequently without the knowledge of the consignor or consignee, and subsequently extracted at a later stage in the transportation process.¹⁰⁴

127. Jamaican authorities indicated that the container was unlikely to have been contaminated in Kingston, particularly emphasizing the security measures in place.¹⁰⁵

128. The seizure on 14 July 2025 was the second seizure in the port of Antwerp reported to the Panel, following the case on 29 September 2023 in which Belgian authorities seized 308.7 kg of cocaine in a shipment originating from Port-au-Prince (S/2024/704, para. 95).

129. Both cases involved the use of the “rip-off” method, with traffickers using legitimate cocoa export channels of goods from Haiti to traffic drugs to Europe. In 2023, prices at European maritime hubs, such as Belgium, were between \$20,540 and \$34,594 per kg of cocaine.¹⁰⁶

3. Seizure of 1,376 kg of cannabis in the Northwest Department

130. On 30 April 2026, the United States Coast Guard stopped a vessel off Môle Saint-Nicolas, in Haiti’s North-West Department, resulting in the seizure of

⁹⁹ Information provided by a Member State, June 2026.

¹⁰⁰ Information provided by a Member State, April 2026.

¹⁰¹ Information provided by a Member State, April and June 2026.

¹⁰² Confidential investigative report, August 2025.

¹⁰³ Information provided by a Member State, February 2026.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Information provided by a Member State, 13 March 2026.

¹⁰⁶ See <https://data.unodc.org/datareport/drug-price>.

approximately 1,376 kg of cannabis, worth approximately \$3.8 million, and the arrest of a Jamaican national. The contraband and suspected smuggler were transferred to Haitian authorities on 3 May 2026.

131. The Jamaican national stated that he was a fisherman and that the vessel carrying the drugs belonged to another Jamaican national. According to the first Jamaican national, he was contacted by this second Jamaican national to arrange a trip from Jamaica to Providenciales, Turks and Caicos Islands, and identified the second Jamaican national as the owner of the drugs. The first Jamaican national further reported that he had agreed to carry out the trip for the sum of \$10,000. He admitted that there had been four individuals aboard the vessel; however, they managed to dive into the sea and escape from the Coast Guard.¹⁰⁷

132. The seizure on 30 April 2026 is the second major interception of cannabis reported by the Panel, following the 2.7 tons intercepted by Dominican authorities in May 2025, in Pedernales, located on the Dominican Republic-Haiti border (S/2025/597, para. 118). Other seizures of smaller quantities were also recorded in the Dominican border towns of Pedernales, Dajabón and Elías Piña. In addition, in August 2024, authorities in the Turks and Caicos Islands intercepted multiple vessels carrying illegal migrants from the northern coast of Haiti, leading to the seizure of more than \$2 million worth of cannabis.¹⁰⁸ The operations reveal a pattern in which illicit drug trafficking is conducted alongside irregular migration flows along the Haiti-Turks and Caicos Islands route. The Panel sent an official communication to the Turks and Caicos Islands authorities, through the United Kingdom, and the response is pending.

E. Illicit financial flows

1. Gangs' sources of financing

133. Revenue generation remains a key driver of gang-related violence. The larger the operational territory, the bigger the population to be preyed upon and therefore, the higher the revenue generated. Sources of revenue include kidnapping, illegal checkpoints, extortion on businesses and the taxation of households for basic services (such as electricity and water), which the gangs do not even supply (see S/2023/674, including annex 23).

134. During the reporting period, gangs in some parts of Port-au-Prince have had to adapt their modus operandi as a result of security operations (see sect. II.A.1) that are notably aimed at clearing the roads of gang control and of illegal checkpoints. These operations have led gangs to conceal their tolling activity on roads (S/2026/241, paras. 53–57) and relocate some checkpoints. Gangs have also intensified kidnappings, making it a main source of revenue in order to cover the loss of toll revenue.¹⁰⁹

135. Nonetheless, these changes in approach do not mean that gangs have ceased to generate revenue in other forms, as reported previously (S/2026/241, paras. 54–57), in addition to receiving financial and logistical support from economic and political actors.

¹⁰⁷ Confidential investigative report, 20 May 2026.

¹⁰⁸ See https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article291178685.html?utm_.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with a gang analyst and with an anti-kidnapping officer; and two confidential reports, November 2025.

Kidnapping for ransom

136. The increase in cases of kidnapping for ransom is more prevalent in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, the wider West Department and the Artibonite Department, with some kidnappings linked to errant officers of the Haitian National Police. Other families decide to negotiate with gangs directly out of fear of retribution or harm to their kidnapped loved ones, rather than report the kidnapping to the police. These factors make it difficult to obtain reliable data on the overall situation on kidnappings.

137. Nevertheless, during the reporting period, available records show an upsurge in the trend perpetrated mainly by 5 Segond, led by Johnson André (HTi.002); 400 Mawozo, led by Joseph Wilson (HTi.004); and Kraze Barye gang, led by Vitelhomme Innocent (HTi.005), all members of the Viv Ansanm alliance (HTe.002). Of 143 cases documented countrywide between January and February, the West Department accounted for 109 cases, 50% of which occurred in Delmas commune. The Artibonite Department accounted for 29 of the cases.¹¹⁰ Gangs use various strategies to kidnap.

138. Among the logistical challenges facing the Anti-Kidnapping Cell of the Haitian National Police is the lack of phone tracking devices and vehicles for tracking victims, as well as an insufficient number of trained negotiators. In addition, gangs continuously change their kidnapping tactics, making it difficult for the specialized cell to detect and prevent such occurrences.¹¹¹ According to several independent sources, the ransom amounts vary on a case-by-case basis, and in one instance during the reporting period, an amount of \$1.5 million was demanded as ransom.¹¹² Actual amounts transferred are however much lower, with the highest transfer disclosed to the Panel during the reporting period amounting to \$153,000. Depending on the wealth of the victim, the ransom amounts commonly paid often range between \$5,000 and \$25,000.¹¹³

How gangs kidnap and receive ransom

139. The Panel found that kidnappings take various forms in terms of which potential victims are targeted (see annex 21) and in which ways the gangs receive ransom, which is mostly paid either in bulk cash handed to their intermediaries, or by taking their victims to banks to transact.¹¹⁴

Bulk cash option

140. This is by far the method preferred by gangs and is the most commonly used. The process entails sometimes lengthy negotiations between, on the one hand, the leader of the gang and/or his representative, and on the other, the family, relatives or friends of victims.¹¹⁵

In-person bank transactions

141. Whereas most financial institutions have closed their operations in areas controlled by gangs, several of those based in Carrefour commune remain operational. Sources, including a former gang member with inside knowledge of gang operations, described to the Panel the tactics gangs use, including how gangs from various communes of the West Department take their victims or the victims' family members

¹¹⁰ Confidential sources.

¹¹¹ Interview with Anti-Kidnapping Cell, May 2026.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Interviews with Anti-Kidnapping Cell and confidential report, 2026.

¹¹⁴ Confidential reports and interviews with anti-kidnapping officers, March and May 2026.

¹¹⁵ Interview with two former victims, a gang analyst and a resident of a gang-controlled area, January and March 2026.

to Carrefour to withdraw money for ransom. They explained why Carrefour commune has emerged as a safe haven for gang economic activities, with few Government-led security operations in that area.

142. The Panel wrote to several banks with branches in Carrefour, as well as to the Bank of the Republic of Haiti, which is the regulator and supervisor of the banking and financial system in the country. In its response, the Bank stated that it had received reports of two cases where gang leaders, their members or their associates accessed banking networks for illicit financial purposes.

143. The Panel investigated a case in which Ralph Woodmyr Louissaint, alias Chalè,¹¹⁶ a member of Viv Ansanm (HTe.002) and one of his concubines, Graciani S. Jean Louis (alias “Smelca”) operated accounts in one of the banks in Carrefour in early 2025.¹¹⁷ Two sources¹¹⁸ and an insider within Chalè’s network described how he was assigned the task of accompanying Lourdemya Raphael (also a concubine to Chalè) to a bank in Diquini, in Carrefour commune, for Lourdemya to transfer Chalè’s bank account into her name. The Panel contacted the bank for further details and among the responses was a confirmation that in January 2026, Smelca, Chalè’s concubine, had granted power of attorney for her account to a third party (see also annex 9 for more information on Chalè).

2. Support to gangs by economic actors

The case of Rosemila Petit Frère

144. Financial and logistical support from economic actors continue to be a source of revenue for gangs in a manner similar to previous cases reported by the Panel, such as in the case of Rony Célestin (see [S/2024/704](#), paras. 167–171). The Panel’s investigation into illicit financial activities linked to the financing of gangs found that Rosemila Petit Frère, a businesswoman and former mayor of Arcahaie commune, West Department, from 2016 to 2020, has had a long-standing relationship with gang leaders of Viv Ansanm (HTe.002), and that she has offered them both financial and logistical support.¹¹⁹ Ms. Petit Frère also acted as an intermediary between gangs and other actors. She was a key player in perpetuating the criminal-political-economic nexus between gangs, political, security and economic actors, including in facilitating communications and financial transactions.¹²⁰ This information was further corroborated by two Member States.

145. In August 2025, Ms. Petit Frère was arrested when transiting the Dominican Republic from Canada.¹²¹ Upon investigation, several message trails implicated her in supporting several Viv Ansanm leaders, including Renel Destina (HTi.003), alias Ti Lapli, the leader of Grand Ravine gang.¹²²

146. In the five months preceding the launch of Viv Ansanm in September 2023, Ms. Petit Frère intensified phone calls with Jean Gardy (alias “Pece Pim Pim”), and Ti Lapli and in three occasions transmitted confidential operational information to Ti

¹¹⁶ See <https://www.rhinews.com/actualites/haiti-justice-un-dossier-judiciaire-met-en-cause-le-chef-de-gang-chale-plusieurs-policiers-et-au-moins-17-personnes-arretees-dans-une-vaste-enquete-sur-le-reseau-viv-ansa/>.

¹¹⁷ A confidential report, May 2026.

¹¹⁸ An anti-gang operations investigator and gang analyst, May 2026.

¹¹⁹ Interview with an anti-corruption analyst, a gang analyst and two confidential sources, February and May 2026.

¹²⁰ A confidential report and interview with a gang analyst, May and June 2026.

¹²¹ <https://haitiantimes.com/2025/08/15/former-arcahaie-mayor-deported-from-dominican-republic/>.

¹²² Two confidential reports and interviews with investigators, November 2025 and May 2026.

Lapli about impending Haitian National Police operations against Grand Ravine and other gangs that later formed the Viv Ansanm alliance.¹²³

147. A confidential report and other accounts from investigators showed that Ms. Petit Frère regularly exchanged information with Prophane Victor (HTi.006),¹²⁴ who is sanctioned for supporting and arming gangs, as well as with Magalie Habitant, a key intermediary between gangs and economic backers and financiers (S/2025/597, paras. 78–80 and annex 22). Given her contacts within the police, Ms. Petit Frère often received sensitive investigation reports from corrupt officers, including those relating to Mr. Victor and Ms. Habitant, which she shared with them and they subsequently used in preparing their legal defences.¹²⁵ Her corrupt dealings with some Haitian National Police officers led Petit Frère to be awarded tenders to supply uniforms to the police, without a competitive tendering process or sufficient oversight.¹²⁶

148. Ms. Petit Frère has used her political connections with former government officials to facilitate people of her choice being appointed to strategic positions in government, with the aim of those appointees embezzling funds on her behalf. This was the case with the appointment of a former Director General of the Social Assistance Fund, whom Ms. Petit Frère put forward for the appointment in 2021.¹²⁷ The person was later charged for embezzling funds from the Fund, and the trail led to Ms. Petit Frère as the main recipient.¹²⁸ Ms. Petit Frère transferred part of the funds to Jean Gardy, the leader of Krache Dife gang, a member of Viv Ansanm, which grew in strength exponentially, and which has been operating mainly in the Bel-Air and Delmas neighbourhoods.¹²⁹

149. Further tracing of the money flows depicts how she laundered it through her three commercial entities; Centre Commercial, Groupe Radio Mono 96.3 FM and Excel Travel, all with their registered offices in Haiti.¹³⁰

150. The Panel wrote to Ms. Petit Frère, giving her an opportunity to respond. In her response, Ms. Petit Frère denied the Panel's findings. The Panel reviewed the information shared by Ms. Petit Frère and shared it with the Committee. The Panel stands by its findings.

3. Natural resources

151. During the reporting period, the Panel continued investigating the illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources, particularly elvers¹³¹ (S/2026/241, paras. 58–66). It also emerged that the Government of Haiti signed a decree in March that provides guidelines on the awarding of mineral concessions and the royalties related to various minerals.

¹²³ Information provided by a Member State, 2026, interview with two investigators, a gang analyst and a civil society member, January and May 2026.

¹²⁴ <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/fr/sanctions/2653/materials/summaries>.

¹²⁵ Interview with Haitian National Police officers and confidential reports, May 2026.

¹²⁶ Interviews with a civil society member and two gang analysts and a confidential report. February 2026.

¹²⁷ Two confidential reports and interviews with two economic analysts, November 2025 and May 2026.

¹²⁸ Interview with an anti-corruption investigator and a gang analyst, Port-au-Prince, February 2026.

¹²⁹ Interview with a Haitian National Police detective, a human rights activist and an anti-corruption official. February 2026.

¹³⁰ Interviews with a financial analyst, an investigator and a gang analyst, and a confidential report. February and May 2026.

¹³¹ “Elvers” are young eels, also known as baby eels, juvenile eels or glass eels, or as “zangi” or “tizangi” in Haitian Creole. These are baby eels undergoing mass migration upriver from the sea. See <https://eeldepot.com/elver/>.

(a) Trade and smuggling of elvers

152. As previously reported, elvers (baby eels) remain one of the most lucrative natural resources in Haiti, with one kilogram going for between \$3,000 and \$5,000 on the international market, while domestically, elvers are sourced from fishers at a mere \$0.34–\$1.70 per kilogram (see [S/2025/597](#), annex 31, for details of how the elvers supply chain operates in Haiti).

(b) Jean-Charles Moïse as the beneficial owner

153. The Panel found that the poorly regulated sector continues to be masked in secrecy and corruption. This, as pointed out earlier, results from the fact that Haiti is not a Party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ([S/2026/241](#), para. 61). The elvers sector is therefore exposed to illicit activities.¹³² The sector is mainly dominated by Jean-Charles Moïse, a businessman from the North Department and the Secretary-General of the Pitit Dessalines political party. He is also a former presidential candidate and a former senator for the North Department.¹³³ The sector will remain vulnerable until Haiti accedes to the Convention. In Haiti, the accession to, or ratification of, international treaties requires signature by the executive branch (President or designated ministers), followed by legislative approval by the Parliament and finally the formal issuance of a ratification decree.¹³⁴ The current lack of a parliament inhibits this process.

Control over issuance of export permits and some customs officers

154. Export permits for elvers are issued annually at the beginning of each fishing season, which lasts from September to March ([S/2025/597](#), para. 132). According to sources, Mr. Moïse's network decides who works in the office that issues elvers export permits.¹³⁵ He wields political and economic power over the elvers sector, controlling the elvers supply chain from exploitation to trade. Mr. Moïse influences the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development through which export licences are issued, as well as customs officials in charge of overseeing exports, so that they act in his favour¹³⁶ (see [S/2025/356](#), paras. 58–61). Some of his former associates, to whom he denied permits, became Mr. Moïse's rivals.¹³⁷

155. Similarly, Mr. Moïse puts pressure on some customs officials to give in to his tax evasion demands – those who fail to comply get transferred elsewhere.¹³⁸ Any refusal to give in to his demands or accept his bribes leads to punishment, as testified by some of his victims.¹³⁹

Smuggling networks linked to transnational organized syndicates

156. Mr. Moïse runs a syndicate of illicit exporters linked to a wider regional network operating in the Caribbean waters. By doing so, he contributes to the weakening of Haiti's economy while abetting smuggling criminal networks that impact the

¹³² Interview with two elvers traders and one trade official, May 2026.

¹³³ See https://www.facebook.com/jiskobouuuuuu/?locale=fo_FO.

¹³⁴ Art. 139 of the Constitution. See https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012.

¹³⁵ Two confidential sources and a government trade and finance official, May 2026.

¹³⁶ See <https://lemidiinfo.com/haiti-agriculture-accusations-de-favoritisme-dans-l'exportation-des-anguilles-moise-jean-charles-sous-le-feu-des-critiques/>.

¹³⁷ Interview with a former exporter, two intermediaries, a former minister and a confidential report, January and May 2026. See also <https://haitiens.org/kiko-moise-anguilles-haiti/>.

¹³⁸ Interview with a former member of the Haiti Chamber of Commerce, a former finance minister and two customs officials, November 2025, February and May 2026.

¹³⁹ Interview with confidential sources, March and May 2026.

region.¹⁴⁰ The complex details of Mr. Moïse's smuggling activities became clearer to the Panel during its investigation of some incidents that occurred during the 2024/2025 elvers season.

157. Sources with inner knowledge of how Mr. Moïse operates,¹⁴¹ including one of his former suppliers of elvers, a lessor of boats and an eels trader in the Dominican Republic, informed the Panel that during the 2024/2025 elvers season, which coincided with the Federal Aviation Authority's suspension of flights from Port-au-Prince to the United States,¹⁴² Mr. Moïse could not export his elvers as expected. Undeterred, he activated his smuggling network in the North Department, through which he channelled the baby eels in a well-coordinated network. This operation involved some Haitian customs officials, who facilitated Mr. Moïse's tax evasion activities, and some Dominican owners of private boats, who provided logistics (boats) to transport the elvers out of Haiti.¹⁴³ Some Haitian suppliers of elvers to Mr. Moïse and Dominican traders explained how Mr. Moïse's networks permeate other economic sectors in the North Department, Mr. Moïse's birthplace,¹⁴⁴ reiterating that he maintains a closely-guarded regional organized criminal market of elvers.

158. The Panel's investigation into an incident that occurred on 20 December 2024 in the Fort-Liberté area, North Department, provided more clarity regarding Mr. Moïse's transnational organized criminal network.¹⁴⁵ Further investigations in the region showed that Mr. Moïse runs a criminal network involved in mixing stocks from illicit suppliers in the region, as well as from Haiti, and exporting them as if they had been only sourced from Haiti. The information was corroborated by several sources either involved in the network or investigating it.¹⁴⁶

159. In June 2026, investigations by the customs officials of a Member State confirmed to the Panel the existence of a smuggling network that sources elvers from Haiti. They shared two cases of live eel smuggling that occurred between October and December 2024. Their analysis of the *modus operandi* led the aforementioned customs officials to conclude that "... both incidents are linked, both by the involvement of at least one person in common and by the existence of a single illicit operational pattern: the attempt to export eels without the legally required documentation". The customs officials added that both cases lacked export documentation and corresponding customs declarations. The Panel investigated further in Haiti and was informed that the two cases were part of several exports that Mr. Moïse's network undertook during the 2024/2025 eel season.¹⁴⁷

(c) Mineral exploitation and trade

160. According to the mineral resources inventory of the national Bureau of Mines and Energy, Haiti holds a high mining potential, with minerals spread across most of the departments¹⁴⁸. On 30 March 2026, the Government issued a decree in the Government gazette, *Le Moniteur*, to regulate the mining sector.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with former senior customs official, an export analyst and a former minister, February 2026.

¹⁴¹ A former member of the Chamber of Commerce, a supplier to Mr. Moïse and a Dominican trader, May 2026.

¹⁴² See <https://ht.usembassy.gov/security-alert-u-s-embassy-port-au-prince-november-24-2025/>.

¹⁴³ Interview with the captain of a cargo boat operating out of Fort-Liberté in the North Department, June 2026.

¹⁴⁴ Confidential sources, April and May 2026.

¹⁴⁵ Communication shared by a Member State's authorities. Information confirmed through interviews with two investigators, May and June 2026.

¹⁴⁶ A first-hand confidential source, Haitian security agents and two elvers traders, April and May 2026.

¹⁴⁷ Two economic crimes investigators and a money laundering expert, March and May 2026.

¹⁴⁸ See <https://www.bme.gouv.ht/index.php?p=minesetcarrieres>.

(d) Undeclared movement of cash

161. Haiti remains largely a cash-based economy and remittances from the diaspora play a major role (see also [S/2025/597](#), para. 136). The federal law of the United States mandates that when entering or leaving the United States, individuals must report amounts exceeding \$10,000 to Customs and Border Protection. That requirement applies whether a person is travelling for business, sending money abroad or bringing savings back to their home country.¹⁴⁹

162. The Panel made a request to the United States under the Freedom of Information Act and was informed that between 3 July 2025 and 17 May 2026, a total of \$428,892 was confiscated from Haitians departing the United States for Haiti because of their failure to declare the amounts in excess of \$10,000 (see annex 22). Money transferred outside of the formal financial networks carries a high risk of being diverted to gangs and other criminal networks, without trace, thereby fuelling the country's instability.

III. Recommendations

163. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the Security Council:

(a) In line with paragraph 1 (e) of resolution [2793 \(2025\)](#), call upon the Gang Suppression Force to set up a mechanism to register, store and manage arms, ammunition and other materiel seized during operations and in cases of transferring the custody of materiel to the Haitian authorities, in order to reinforce Haitian processes and management capacity;

(b) Call upon the Gang Suppression Force to continue to share information with the Panel and facilitate access by the Panel to seized arms, ammunition and other relevant materiel, before transfer or disposal;

(c) In line with paragraph 14 of resolution [2700 \(2023\)](#), call upon the Gang Suppression Force to implement an effective mechanism for managing weapons and ammunition used by the Force's battalions being deployed in Haiti and to report any loss of materiel to the Panel.

164. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes the following recommendations to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti:

(a) Continue to consider the statements of cases and additional related information submitted by the Panel in 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026 and update the entry lists and narrative summaries of individuals and entities designated pursuant to Security Council resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), as necessary;

(b) Invite the relevant representative of the Government of Haiti involved in the implementation of the sanctions regime to share the progress made in the implementation of the sanctions regime in Haiti and related challenges;

(c) Encourage Member States to support the Government of Haiti in advancing the implementation of the 2026 intervention strategy of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, through technical and financial support;

(d) Encourage Member States to continue to build the capacity of the Haitian National Police and Haitian Armed Forces with adequate resources to combat gangs,

¹⁴⁹ See <https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/money-monetary-instruments>.

including equipment to support investigations (such as related to kidnapping and illicit trafficking), air and maritime assets, and all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles;

(e) Encourage Member States contributing personnel to the Gang Suppression Force to ensure that their contingents adhere strictly to international human rights law, with particular attention to the prevention of and accountability for sexual and gender-based violence, and to integrate these standards into predeployment training and rules of engagement;

(f) Encourage the Government of Haiti and relevant Member States to ensure that all Haitian and foreign private military and security companies operating in Haiti adhere to international human rights law, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers.

165. The Panel of Experts on Haiti makes a recommendation to the Government of Haiti, that it consider the adoption of a decree regulating the exploitation and trade of elvers, pending accession to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.

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Annex 1: Methodology and Opportunity to Reply

The Panel adopted a decision rule of consensus, meaning that all members of the Panel were required to agree on the text, findings and recommendations of the report. However, if any member of the Panel had a difference of opinion or reservation, the report could still be adopted by a majority vote of three out of four members.

The Panel reviewed social media and other open sources, but no information was used as evidence unless it could be corroborated by multiple independent sources. This was done to ensure that the information was reliable and met the highest achievable standard of proof.

The Panel provides individuals and entities recommended for sanctioning the opportunity to reply. This gives individuals or entities the opportunity to present an alternative narrative and to provide concrete and specific evidence in their support.

The Panel's methodology for the opportunity to reply is as follows:

1. Providing an individual or entity with an opportunity to reply should be the norm.
2. An individual or entity may not be given the opportunity to reply if the Panel concludes, based on their own assessment, that there is a risk that by doing so it would:
 - a) Result in the individual or entity destroying evidence, tampering with a witness or moving assets if they receive advance notice of a possible recommendation for designation;
 - b) Restrict the Panel's further access to places or vital sources;
 - c) Endanger Panel sources or Panel members;
 - d) Jeopardise humanitarian access for humanitarian actors in the field including the United Nations or any other local or international organizations; or
 - e) For any reason that is clearly justified by the circumstances.

After an individual or entity is designated by the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee, it is possible to request a de-listing process through the mechanism established by the Sanctions Committee.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ See <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2653/guidelines> and see also <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/2653/materials/procedures-Delisting>

Annex 2: Tables of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from December 2025 to July 2026

Member State	Number of letters sent	Info fully supplied	Info partially supplied	No information provided	No answer	NA/ visit accepted
Bahamas	2			Requested for extension		
Belgium	2		2			
Brazil	1	1				
Canada	1			Requested for extension		
Colombia	2		2			
Ecuador	1				1	
Jamaica	2	2				
Dominican Republic	7	6	1			Accepted
Haiti	1				1	
Kenya	1	1				
United Kingdom	2			Requested for extension (Turks and Caicos Islands)		Postponed (Visit to Turks and Caicos islands)
United States of America	2		2			

Company	Number of letters sent	Info fully supplied	Info partially supplied	No information provided	No answer	NA
Banque de la République d'Haiti	1	1				
Haitian bank 1	1	1				
Air freight company 1	1		1			
Haitian bank 2	1	1				
Logistics company 1	1				1	
Air freight company 2	1			1		
Haitian bank 3	1	1				

Annex 3: The impact of delayed implementation of UN sanctions

The *Banque de la République d'Haiti* (BRH), which is Haiti's central bank, informed the Panel that bank accounts belonging to Kempes Sanon (HTi.009) with an amount of 383,520.99HTG (\$2,910.06USD) and to Prophane Victor (HTi.006) with an amount of 55,486.81HTG (\$421.02USD) were frozen (see also S/2025/356, para. 9 for an amount of about \$300USD frozen earlier). Despite this positive effort, the Panel is of the view that the process of implementing sanctions in Haiti remains slow, impacting the effectiveness of the regime. Two major observations emerge.

Firstly, the meagre amounts of money frozen by banks do not correlate with the wealth accumulated by those individuals. For instance, the cumulative amount so far frozen for Prophane Victor, a businessman and former influential public figure is less than \$1,000USD. Secondly, none of his fixed assets have been identified and frozen. The hesitancy by Haitian authorities to take immediate action to freeze bank accounts and seize property of sanctioned individuals and entities leaves a lacuna in which individuals can move their assets out of reach for sanctions. This is demonstrated in the responses received by the Panel from the BRH and commercial banks with regard to sanctions implementation, as reflected below.

Below:

Table I - An excerpt of a table shared by the BRH showing the amounts frozen across the board for respective sanctioned individuals by commercial banks and microfinance institutions in response to the UN sanctions.

Name and Surname	Amount frozen in HTG	Amount frozen in USD
Jimmy Chérizier	0	0
Johnson André	0	0
Renel Destina	0	0
Vitelhomme Innocent	0	0
Prophane Victor	55 486.81	-220.72
Luckson Elan	0	0
Dimitri Herard	0	2.63
Kempes Sanon	383 520.99	0

Table II: An excerpt of a table shared by one of the commercial banks with the details of sanctioned individuals and actions taken.

It is worth noting that only the account belonging to Kempes Sanon (HTi.006) was frozen. The accounts of the other individuals, also sanctioned by the UN and unilaterally by several Member States, were closed meaning that the individuals could have withdrawn their monies.

Name and Surname	HTG Account	Amount in HTG	Date of sanction	Account status		Reason for closing/freezing
Jimmy Chérizier	xxxx	6,772.15	21 Oct. 2022	Closed	Dec. 2022	Unilateral sanction / US Treasury
Vitelhomme Innocent	xxxx	96,981.09	8 Dec. 2023	Closed	Dec. 2022	Unilateral sanction / USA Treasury
Dimitri Herard	xxxx	39,975.69	17 Oct. 2025	Closed	March 2025	Canada Unilateral sanction
Kempes Sanon	xxxx	383,520.99	17 Oct. 2025	Frozen	Oct. 2025	UN Sanction

Annex 4: Implementation of the assets freeze and the travel ban by regional countries

The Panel contacted several Member States and territories in the region to establish whether any assets belonging to the sanctioned individuals had been identified and frozen, and if they had traveled to those countries.

The Dominican Republic informed the Panel during the Panel's official visit in May 2026 that they had not identified any assets in this regard, and remained watchful regarding any attempts by the sanctioned individuals to enter the country.

The United States stated that, "the nine individuals listed – Jimmy Cherizier, Johnson Andre, Renel Destina, Wilson Joseph, Vitel'homme Innocent, Prophane Victor, Luckson Elan, Dimitri Herard, and Kempes Sanon – are sanctioned by the United States in addition to the United Nations. As a result, these individuals are not able to enter or transit through the United States".

The United States added that as a result of these designations, "all property and interests in property of the sanctioned individuals that are in the United States or in the possession or control of United States persons are blocked and must be reported to Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons, are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt, OFAC's regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person".

At the time of reporting, Turks and Caicos Islands, through the United Kingdom had not yet responded to the Panel's request for information.

Annex 5 – Relative security gains and advances in gang strongholds

Since late 2025, intensified security operations by Haitian authorities supported by an international private contractor, have been aiming to establish a buffer zone around the *Autorité Portuaire Nationale* (APN), reopening key logistical corridors to the city center as well as at restoring traffic along national roads (RN) linking the capital to the north (RN1), south (RN2), centre and key border crossings (RN3 and RN8)¹⁵¹.

From late 2025 to February 2026, the HNP - bolstered by increased operational capacity and supported by the Task Force (consisting of police and army officers, as well as international private contractors) and the GSF¹⁰ - entailed the recovery of areas stretching from Delmas 30 to Lower Delmas (commune of Delmas), passing through Bel-Air, Nazon and Solino, and extending to Boulevard La Saline (commune of Port-au-Prince). These localities were under pressure from gangs such as Les Argentins (led by Kempes Sanon, a.k.a “Kempes” - HTi.009). Tokyo (led by Ralph Woodmyr Louissant, a.k.a “Chalè”), Krache Dife (led by Jean Gardy, a.k.a “Pece Pim Pim”), Delmas 6 (led by Jimmy Chérizier, a.k.a “Barbeque” - HTi.001) and La Saline (led by Bout Janjan). While Les Argentins was weakened by *Viv Ansanm* infighting, the others were significantly destabilized by the police¹⁵² (see Annex 3 of S/2026/241).

Operations also targeted the Simon Pelé gang (led by Stevenson Albert, a.k.a “Djouma”), reasserting control over key areas between Delmas 19 (in Delmas commune) and Simon Pelé (Cité Soleil commune) and clearing the road to Port-au-Prince international airport, where the gang was disrupting movement by erecting illegal tolls and ransacking businesses along this strategic axis¹⁵³. The reopening, on 7 February 2026, of the Carrefour Aéroport sub police station - attacked and burned by *Viv Ansanm* on 4 March 2024 - marked a significant step in regaining control from gangs¹⁵⁴. However, the resurgence of inter-gang fighting from March 2026 in the Cul-de-Sac Plain (Annex 12) significantly deteriorated the security situation around the international airport¹⁵⁵.

The operations however did not result in gangs’ dismantlement, which would include sidelining key leaders and disrupting their supply lines. While some gangs relocated to other areas, others have maintained a mobile, diffuse and opportunistic presence in several areas (see Annex 10). In addition, kidnappings have notably increased in Delmas commune, as well as on key corridors like the airport road and the Panamerican axis, having also spread to Bourdon neighborhood (Port-au-Prince commune), as well as to Pétiön-Ville and Tabarre communes. As a developing phenomenon, gangs are taking victims to banks to withdraw or transfer ransoms to accounts used by gangs (see section II.E.1.a of the present report)¹⁵⁶.

These challenges hinder the police from consolidating control, particularly in areas cleared of gang presence, and with the absence of stabilization efforts. Territorial gains remain temporary and do not produce lasting effects unless accompanied by sustained security presence, territorial consolidation, restoration of public services and community stabilisation¹⁵⁷.

From March 2026, security operations involving the police, the Haitian Armed Forces, and the Task Force, advanced into the southern part of downtown Port-au-Prince, liberating areas such as Babiole, Pacot and Turgeau (commune of Port-au-Prince) up to the stadium Sylvie Castor¹⁵⁸. The army’s increased involvement with regular patrols in the area have helped strengthen control in the city center¹⁵⁹.

Advances in gang strongholds long outside state control

In mid-March 2026, security forces advanced in areas which were outside state control for significant time, such as Village de Dieu and Martissant, strongholds of 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs respectively, in the southern part of Port-au-Prince. On 18 March 2026, the police reached its former substation in Martissant, abandoned in June 2021 due to gang

¹⁵¹ Interviews with police officers, an international security provider and gang analysts, 2026.

¹⁵² Interviews with gang analysts and individuals living in gang-controlled areas, January and February 2026, and May 2026.

¹⁵³ Interviews with gang analyst and senior police officer, February and May 2026.

¹⁵⁴ Interviews with with gang and human right analysts, police officers and former government official working on anti-gang operations, February 2026 and with senior police officer, 21 May 2026.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with security analysts, May and June 2026

¹⁵⁶ Interviews with senior police officer and gang analysts, May 2026.

¹⁵⁷ Interviews with police officers and gang analysts, May and June 2026.

¹⁵⁸ Interviews with gang analysts and senior police officers, May 2026.

¹⁵⁹ Interviews with gang analysts, and senior defense government official, May and June 2026.

control. On 1 June 2026, after the deployment of drones by the Task Force, the police re-entered Village de Dieu, marking a major symbolic return after the failed March 2021 operation in which several police officers were killed¹⁶⁰.

However, according to a civil society representative working in Martissant, the operation was more of an in-and-out armored incursion rather than a sustained effort to hold the area. According to him, an operation to retake the Martissant police substation would be highly challenging, given the presence of a checkpoint directly in front and, a few meters away, a heavily manned gang cell linked to senior Grand Ravine leadership¹⁶¹. Additionally, operations in Village-de-Dieu are also said to have been driven by considerations beyond purely security objectives - including to secure the release of civil servants, victims of kidnapping - and both lasted only a few days. A dozen of gang members were killed during the operation in Village de Dieu¹⁶².

As a result of operations in Village de Dieu, the *Komite Pwoteksyon Timoun Site Lètènèl (KPTSL)*, a civil society organization, reported that at least three children were killed and two others seriously injured, some at risk of amputation. A further dozen victims were reported by residents. These casualties raise concerns about excessive use of force and the impact on the population during operations¹⁶³.

¹⁶⁰ For 2021 operations, see: <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/267892/the-haitian-national-police-returns-to-village-de-dieu>

¹⁶¹ Interview with civil society representative working on gang-affected area, June 2026.

¹⁶² Interview with individual with first-hand knowledge on gang dynamics, June 2026.

¹⁶³ Interview with civil society representative and gang analyst, June 2026.

Security operations in Village de Dieu neighborhood



Security officer seizing weapon from gang member



Gang members carrying the body of another gang member

Source: Stills from drone images shared with the Panel on 1 June 2026.

Armoured vehicles entering Village de Dieu

Source: Photographs shared on HNP Facebook page, 1 June 2026. See:
<https://web.facebook.com/pnh.ht>


Civilian casualties of drone strikes in Village de Dieu – March 2026

Gruesome images

<i>Source: Stills from videos shared with the Panel on 2 July 2026.</i>

Annex 6 – Areas under gang control in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments

Map of gang-controlled areas in the West, Centre and Artibonite departments, June 2026



Source: UNDSS / UN Geospatial

The boundaries and names shown, and the designation used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Annex 7 – Gang presence in southern Haiti amid security operations

Southwestern outskirts of the capital as a growing hub for gangs

Drone strikes and police operations in areas stretching from downtown Port-au-Prince - including Marché Salomon and the Bicentenaire - up to Rue Saint-Honoré have driven gangs to the southwestern outskirts of Port-au-Prince.

While the police dismantled many checkpoints in downtown, gangs set up other illegal tolls in the streets of Boulosse neighborhood (Port-au-Prince commune), in the southern zone of the capital. At least five checkpoints are held by gang leaders including Izo, and Emmanuel Salomon, a.k.a “Manno” (5 Second), and Bougoy, Kilik and Ti Lapli (Grand Ravine)¹⁶⁴. Christ-Roi Chery (a.k.a “Chrisla”), head of Ti Bwa has also established at least three checkpoints along the alternative route connecting Carrefour to Gressier communes, in southwestern edge of the capital. Since movement along the RN2 - linking Port-au-Prince to the South - has been severely disrupted by insecurity, residents are subject to a 3–6-hour mountainous journey, in which motorcycle riders pay \$250 HTG at each toll belonging to Chrisla¹⁶⁵. Of note, several economic actors benefit from the blocking on the RN2 (see Annex 8).

On another note, Carrefour commune continues to be a haven for *Viv Ansanm* and acolytes such as Dimitri Herard (HTi.008), where they move freely within the community. Despite the absence of the police, schools, banks, and markets remain operational. Behind the “apparent normalcy” in the commune lies a parallel system of gang governance which replaced public authority (see Annex 5 of S/2025/597). For instance, Chrisla and other gang leaders rely on the commercial bank agencies in Carrefour for transactions linked to kidnappings, extortion, and investment activities (see section II.E.A.1.a)¹⁶⁶. When entering banks, gang members sometimes leave their firearms at the security entrance and proceed inside to access services¹⁶⁷. On 11 May 2026, Chrisla renewed his calls on the government to appoint a close associate of his for a senior public position in the commune, while threatening to paralyze municipal institutions if his demand was not met¹⁶⁸. Chrisla’s demand reflects further efforts to entrench influence within formal governance structures and secure political leverage.

Attempts of gang expansion to southern departments

Attacks from 13 April 2026 in the South-East department, in the localities of Kajak (3rd section Macary) and Seguin (1st section Fond Jean Noël), in Marigot commune, illustrate the expansion of gang violence beyond traditional gang strongholds. This also marks one of the first major security crises in a region previously considered relatively safe. *Viv Ansanm* gangs carried out coordinated assaults, killing at least five residents and eight members of a self-defense group, burning the Seguin police substation, destroying two police vehicles and seizing police motorcycles and uniforms¹⁶⁹. Reinforced by gang members coming from Kenscoff, *Viv Ansanm* renewed clashes on 20 April 2026, after security operations on 16 April 2026. Violence triggered the displacement of approximately 5,656 individuals¹⁷⁰.

Attacks over Seguin marked a significant development. The area sits in a strategic high-altitude area, overlooking key corridors linking the coastal city of Jacmel (with cultural and economic significance), the mountainous and agricultural areas of La Vallée and Kenscoff, and Port-au-Prince. In addition, control over Seguin enables and facilitates drug and arms trafficking activities, through the corridor of Carrefour-Kenscoff-Seguín-Marigot and use of the port of Marigot and the border cross-point of Anse-à-Pitres¹⁷¹. It is not surprising, therefore, that links between Chrisla (who controls Carrefour commune), and Izo (involved in drug trafficking) have grown closer. The Panel previously visited Jacmel, as well as the Dominican town of Pedernales located directly opposite Anse-à-Pitres in Haiti and witnessed the high vulnerability of the region to drug trafficking (see section 2.D of S/2025/597).

With the takeover of southern regions, *Viv Ansanm* would effectively complete a de facto encirclement of the capital, given its control over key cities and strategic corridors linking the capital to other regions. In order to achieve this, the road connecting the West (through Kenscoff commune) to the Southeast (Marigot commune) has been kept under the control

¹⁶⁴ Interviews with first-hand knowledge of gang dynamics, May and June 2026.

¹⁶⁵ *Idem*.

¹⁶⁶ *Idem*.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with confidential source, May 2026.

¹⁶⁸ https://www.tiktok.com/@christprodsmusic0/video/7638664948482084109?_r=1&_t=ZS-96NybJLo2mC

¹⁶⁹ Interviews with residents and gang analyst, 2026, and Le Nouvelliste, n° 42458, 20 et 21 avril 2026.

¹⁷⁰ <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-891-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-kajak-and>

¹⁷¹ Interviews with police officer, residents, and gang analysts, 2026.

since the initial attacks on Kenscoff more than a year and a half ago. An alternative route has been established which is only accessible by motorbikes, where gangs have been charging \$250 HTG for a roundtrip at their checkpoint located at the level of Kafou Badjo, Sourçailles communal section of Kenscoff¹⁷².

Following the attacks on Seguin, protesters took to the streets of Jacmel to call for urgent government intervention, fearing that the South would turn into another 'lost territory'. The police reported the arrest of several gang members, including women, seeking to plant themselves in the department, including from 5 Second, Grand Ravine, and Ti Bwa¹⁷³.

Gangs have also attempted to infiltrate other departments. On 13 January 2026 in Jérémie, the main city of the Grand'Anse department, the police arrested Jean Misnord (a.k.a "Fado"), the third chief of Simon Pelé gang, led by Djouma Albert (a.k.a "Djouma")¹⁷⁴. To reach the Grand'Anse department, an influential actor from the department transported Fado with his boat from Wharf Jeremie, Cité Soleil commune. Fado then met with Guy Philippe on several occasions in Grand'Anse, the last time being in January 2026¹⁷⁵. The Panel has previously highlighted the risk that Guy Phillipe, who cultivate close ties with gangs, poses to the country's stability and peace.

¹⁷² Interview with transport agents, May 2026.

¹⁷³ HNP Facebook page, 2026.

¹⁷⁴ HNP Facebook page, January 2026.

¹⁷⁵ Interviews with confidential sources, February and May 2026.

Annex 8 - Insecurity as a driver of economic interests: the RN2 blockade

For over two years, movement along the National Road #2 (RN2), linking the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and the southern region - including the departments of Nippes, South, South-East and Grand'Anse - has been completely cut off by walls erected along the RN2 and by gang violence.

In November 2023, the Mariani district of the Carrefour commune, lying on the main corridor connecting Port-au-Prince to the southern region of Haiti, fell under the control of the Grand Ravine "Team Asansè" (also known as Team Ascenseur), led by Beliose Louis Jeune (a.k.a "Bout Ba"). This has hampered the movement of people, goods and services along the RN2 (see section II.A.2 and annex 8 of S/2024/253).

In May 2024, the Grand Ravine gang extended into the neighbouring Gressier, located to the south of Mariani, which has been under the control of the 103 Zombie group of the Grand Ravine gang, led by Charlemagne Dorin (a.k.a "Ti Bebe Bougôy") (see S/2024/704).

The reopening of the RN2 has been one of the main concerns of the new municipal authorities of the Gressier commune. Efforts by the municipality and the local population resulted in the destruction of the walls impeding movement, on 19 May 2026. On 29 May 2026, the police station in Gressier reopened after being closed for two years, although it has relocated to another area¹⁷⁶. However, as of the time of drafting, no police operation has been effectively carried out to enable traffic to resume along the RN2. In fact, the disruption on the RN2 has been tied to major interests, benefiting for instance, business operators handling private flights and barges and controlling ports¹⁷⁷. Insecurity creates economic incentives that benefit many.

Air and sea routes have been used to bypass gang-controlled areas and roadblocks thereby benefitting air and maritime operators. By sea, this route connects the National Port Authority (APN) terminal in Port-au-Prince to coastal access points such as Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve, and Léogâne, located in the southern edge of the capital. Private barge owners charge between \$ 2,500 - \$5,000 USD per container, depending on the value of the cargo being transported for one-way trip between the APN port, in Port-au-Prince, and southwestern communes of Petit-Goâve and Miragoâne¹⁷⁸. At the beginning of 2025, someone paid about \$ 300,000 HTG (approximately \$ 2,300 USD) to travel one-way from APN to the southern region¹⁷⁹. A number of police officers ensure the security of the about 8 barges plying this route and reportedly receive substantial financial compensation from barge owners. Private actors also reportedly pay for police security around the APN zone¹⁸⁰.

During the Panel visit to Jacmel, South-East department, in June 2025, civil society representatives informed the Panel that operators of air taxi services used to charge \$1,000 USD per flight connecting Jacmel to Port-au-Prince in 2023, which could carry up to three passengers only. If there was one passenger, they paid the price of three, and if there were multiple passengers, the cost was shared among them.

Sources disclosed to the Panel how they received pressure from business figures to slow down their efforts for the unblocking of RN2, as well as for the security of the APN port area¹⁸¹.

The Panel will continue its investigations into the involvement of private actors in the instability linked to gang control of roads and port areas.

¹⁷⁶ Interviews with local authority, May and June 2026.

¹⁷⁷ Interviews with local authorities, police officers, gang analysts, representatives of civil society and political party, June 2025 and May and June 2026.

¹⁷⁸ Interviews with private actors, local authority, gang analyst and confidential source, May and June 2026.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with confidential source, June 2026.

¹⁸⁰ Information from confidential source, May 2026 and confidential source, June 2026.

¹⁸¹ Interviews with primary sources, May and June 2026.

Annex 9 – Key challenges hindering effective security operations

1. Collusion between gangs and corrupt police officers

Police investigations launched in February 2026 revealed links between at least six police officers and the Tokyo gang's leader, Ralph Woodmyr Louissant (a.k.a "Chalè"), including a police officer called Charlemagne Volmar (a.k.a "Titit" or "Steeve").

The criminal network was involved in various criminal acts, notably kidnapping, murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and criminal conspiracy. Chalè's gang was for instance responsible for the kidnapping of several individuals. On 11 March 2025, the gang kidnapped two individuals in Delmas 31 (released after paying ransoms of \$ 400,000 HTG and 465,000 HTG each (approximately \$3,100 USD to \$3,600 USD), and one in Cité Militaire, released after paying \$ 2,000,000 HTG (approximately \$15,000 USD). Other kidnappings were reported on 4 April 2025, along the airport road, and on 7 July 2025, where two individuals were kidnapped in Delmas 33; where victims were also released after paying ransoms. The gang also robbed the victims' vehicles¹⁸².

Charlemagne Volmar was in charge of picking up Chalès' girlfriend, Wideline Louis (a.k.a "Wide") at the airport after her return from the Dominican Republic. Based on a confidential report, Chalè would always call Charlemagne after his gang members had carried out a kidnapping to inform him of any potential loss of life. Charlemagne's role also consisted of identifying HNP checkpoints, thereby enabling gang members to carry out kidnappings without being intercepted by the police. Charlemagne Volmar also undertook other duties, such as verifying the financial status of certain individuals prior to their abduction. He was also responsible for transporting large sums of money intended for the purchase of ammunition on behalf of the gang. He also identified another police officer known as Poupy, who sold an AR-15 rifle to Chalè¹⁸³.

Another police officer, Friendly Jean-Baptiste, a.k.a "Ti Solèy," also member of the Tokyo gang, was responsible for supplying the gang with firearms and ammunition. His function as police officer and ties to all *Viv Ansanm* members enabled him to become a key supplier of firearms and ammunition. He also informed Chalè about all police operations targeting the city center, particularly the Tokyo neighborhood and the Saint-Martin Street¹⁸⁴.

In another case, on 13 January 2026, the police arrested Jean Misnord (a.k.a "Fado"), the third chief of Simon Pelé gang, led by Stevenson Albert (a.k.a "Djouma"). Fado disclosed that two police officers that escaped prison with Djouma are part of the gang, that includes over 180 individuals armed with fusils¹⁸⁵.

In October 2023, a police officer named Cleevens Degazon (a.k.a "My Man") was arrested for his association with the Ti Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (a.k.a "Chrisla"). Despite being dismissed from the police in August 2023, My Man - who was also associated with the 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs - was colluding with Ryvelor Domond, an active officer of the judicial police. The latter was in frequent communication with Chrisla and had contacts with influential Ti Bwa members, including other police officers by the names of Sony Caidor (a.k.a "Kzo"), Shadbir Rooster Joseph (a.k.a "Peter" or "POG"), Gaspard Henold, and Joseph Sonson¹⁸⁶.

2. Gangs' resilient structures and adaptive responses to ongoing security pressure

According to individuals with first-hand information on gangs and security actors, the fear of gangs regarding security operations, including drone strikes, has reduced. The deployment of GSF does not seem to instil particular concern for most gangs¹⁸⁷.

Senior HNP officers highlighted some of the challenges in confronting gangs, describing them as highly resilient and structured. When struck, gangs - such as 5 Segond, led by Johnson André (a.k.a "Izo" – HTi.002) - draw on reserves of members, including former prison escapees, who are tasked with holding and consolidating territory. Gang members operate tactically, advancing from house to house, building reinforced walls for protection, and demonstrating both local terrain knowledge and a degree of operational coordination. They have increased physical obstructions to impede the police

¹⁸² Confidential investigative report, February 2026.

¹⁸³ Interviews with confidential sources, and confidential investigative report, 2026.

¹⁸⁴ Confidential investigative report, February 2026.

¹⁸⁵ Interviews with confidential sources, 2026.

¹⁸⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, and confidential documents, 2024 and 2026.

¹⁸⁷ Interviews with civil society representative working in gang-controlled area, direct source in contact with gangs, police officer, security and gang analysts, 2026.

advancement and are trained to fight effectively, being heavily armed¹⁸⁸. They use Molotov cocktails and rudimentary countermeasures against drones' attacks, such as placing nets over high-value areas, and propane gas tankers to hinder operations¹⁸⁹. Of note, interviews with individuals living in gang-controlled areas and a police officer with operational oversight, indicated that Izo previously possessed a drone detection system installed by foreigners, but this was destroyed by security operations¹⁹⁰.

Losses in gangs' ranks trigger further recruitment, including of children. An individual with first knowledge on gang dynamics revealed that members of 5 Segond and Grand Ravine gangs are not only recruited within gang-controlled areas, but also from youth coming from places such as Delmas and Pétion-Ville communes, who view joining gangs as a form of employment. New recruits can earn about \$1,000 USD and a motorbike for their enrolment. Children can receive between 15-25 thousand HTG every two weeks. In addition to receiving provisions such as food, alcohol, and drugs, they may receive a risk allowance of \$500 USD when they engage in important combat operations. Besides, since late 2025, the role of women in gangs such as 5 Segond and Grand Ravine has evolved from functions such as antennas to direct engagement in combat and participation in checkpoint operations. Both gangs have some cells that are exclusively female¹⁹¹.

Gangs are also deeply embedded across multiple segments of society. Their members are not limited to those holding weapons, but include men and women who provide intelligence, resources, and logistical support to gangs, and are able to move with less suspicion, and even cross borders. Late February 2026, Wideline Louis (a.k.a "Wide"), girlfriend of Tokyo's gang leader and member of the gang, was arrested at the national terminal of Port-au-Prince airport upon her return from the Dominican Republic. Her role included buying clothing and supplies for the gang. In another case, three individuals were arrested by the police in June 2025 for attempting to smuggle commercial drones from the Dominican Republic for *Viv Ansanm*. They were, however, released (see paras. 51 and 77 of S/2025/597). Earlier, in September 2024, the police arrested Vanessa Sanon and Marie André Nathalie Balaam, an employee at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, for their association with the Les Argentins gang, who were respectively sister and concubine of its leader Kempes Sanon (a.k.a "Kempes"). Vanessa Sanon operated as the gang's financial manager, while his concubine acted as a scout while managing a business on behalf of the gang leader¹⁹².

The alliance is also anchored in transnational trafficking networks that sustain them with arms, ammunition, and logistical resources, and hinder security operations, since their 'backers' are widely connected to structures of the government and the private sphere.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with senior police officer with first-hand knowledge of gangs and operational oversight, May 2026.

¹⁸⁹ Interviews with senior police officer with operational oversight, individual with first-hand knowledge of gang dynamics, May 2026, and international security source, June 2026.

¹⁹⁰ Interviews with senior police officer and civil society representative working in gang-controlled areas, May and June 2026.

¹⁹¹ Interview with individual with first knowledge on gang dynamics, June 2026.

¹⁹² Interviews with police officers, 2024.

Annex 10 - Gang reorganisation in unstable post-operational settings: the case of Bel-Air

Intensified security operations notably undertaken in early 2026, initially displaced gangs from their areas (see paragraph 17 of S/2026/241). However, unstable post-operational scenario led to a security vacuum that was progressively filled by a diffuse, mobile and opportunistic presence of gangs, renewing instability¹⁹³. The current situation in Bel-Air, following security efforts in early 2026, provides a good example.

Bel-Air is a strategic area for gangs. It also offers a fallback zone and a strategic corridor, facilitating regrouping and logistical support for criminal activities, notably kidnapping. Key actors in Bel-Air highlighted gang dynamics such as territorial consolidation and the re-emergence of violent hotspots across key sectors, after security operations. After the MSS base relocated out of Bel-Air, no security mechanism prevented gangs of returning to the area. Police patrols were mainly concentrated in securing Port-au-Prince downtown area and state infrastructure rather than focusing on Bel Air neighbourhoods¹⁹⁴.

Despite Les Argentins gang being nearly dismantled by *Viv Ansanm* (see Annex 3 of S/2026/241), its leader - Kempes Sanon (a.k.a “Kempes”) - continues to operate with the Grand Ravine gang, led by Renel Destina (a.k.a “Ti Lapli” - Hti.003). Kempes exercises criminal control over the Magloire Ambroise corridor, a key axis linking downtown to central and southern neighborhoods, and shaping access to Bel-Air via Champ de Mars, in the city center; thus, particularly useful for kidnapping activities.

As the result of security operations against 5 Segond stronghold, most of its members had to leave Bel-Air to fight. The Gran Ravine gang has then exercised strongest hold in several areas of Bel-Air. Additionally, Jamesley, the gang leader of Baz Demeplè maintains a presence in the area, despite renewed operations against his hideout in late May 2026¹⁹⁵.

Additionally, residents have been rendered vulnerable to gang recruitment due to the fragmentation of their urban settlements with lootings and destruction of buildings, which resulted into massive displacement of residents and the breakdown of services. Likewise, residents are reluctant to return to their neighborhoods of origin. Gaps in community violence reduction programmes - an issue that broadly affects the country – contributes to continued relapse of violence in environments controlled by gangs.

¹⁹³ Interviews with gang analysts and local authority, May 2026 and confidential note. Mars 2026.

¹⁹⁴ *Idem*.

¹⁹⁵ HNP Facebook page, June 2026.

Annex 11 – Government Support Program to the Peace Brigadiers (Brigadiers de Paix)



Conclusion

Le Manuel de Procédure des Brigadiers de Paix vise à encadrer la participation citoyenne à la prévention sécuritaire dans un cadre institutionnel.

Les Brigadiers de Paix constituent des leviers communautaires complémentaires aux institutions officielles, agissant avec discipline, neutralité et respect des droits fondamentaux pour contribuer à la protection des populations.



Folder



**Programme d'Appui
aux Brigadiers de Paix**

Direction Générale
MICT

**MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR
ET DES COLLECTIVITES
TERRITORIALES
/ PRIMATURE**






Appui Technique

- Formation initiale et continue en sécurité communautaire, renseignement de proximité, premier secours, droits humains, gestion positive des conflits et disciplines opérationnelle
- Collaboration stratégique avec les structures étatiques locales (les délégations et vice-délégations, la Mairie, les commissariats et unités territoriales de la PNH)
- Distribution de matériel de base : Gilets, radios, Lampes solaires, sifflets, etc.

Appui Financier

- En cours de budgétisation par le Gouvernement
- Prévision de la création d'un fonds national de sécurisation du Territoire pour appuyer durablement les brigadiers et les communautés
- Mobilisation des partenaires nationaux et internationaux pour soutenir cette stratégie de résilience locale.



Un engagement politique fort pour la paix et la sécurité nationale

Le Gouvernement de Transition dirigé par le Premier Ministre Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, entend donner une réponse stratégique à la montée vertigineuse de l'insécurité. Pour ce faire le Premier Ministre Alix Didier Fils-Aimé a initié ce programme intitulé : Programme d'Appui aux Brigadiers de Paix.

Cette initiative est mise en œuvre par le Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales (MICT), dans une dynamique de reconquête du territoire national, de promotion, de la participation citoyenne et de restauration de l'autorité de l'État à l'échelle nationale

Une approche innovante de gouvernance territoriale axée sur la résilience communautaire, impliquant des anciens et actuels membres des forces de l'ordre, les leaders engagés dans la construction active de la paix.

Fondamentaux du programme

Organisation et accompagnement des brigadiers

Légitimation de la résistance citoyenne à l'insécurité

Création d'un climat de paix à travers le pays.

Objectifs

- Accompagner les brigadiers de paix œuvrant déjà dans les quartiers précaires et zones cibles (principalement dans les départements de l'Ouest, l'Arribonite et du Centre.
- Légitimer l'action citoyenne de résistance à l'insécurité, par une formation adéquate et un encadrement responsable
- Renforcer la coordination entre les brigadiers, les autorités locales et les forces de l'ordre.
- Restaurer progressivement l'autorité de l'État, à travers la responsabilisation des structures locales et la mobilisation de la population.

Axes d'Appui et d'Intervention

Appui administratif

- Identification et enregistrement des Brigadiers (Sous la supervision du MICT, des délégations et des municipalités.
- Attribution de documents officiels et badges valides par les autorités compétentes

Mise en place d'un mécanisme de suivi et de supervision continue.



Source : Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales, 2026

Annex 12 – *Viv Ansanm* inter-fighting in Croix-des-Bouquets and Cité Soleil communes

Between 6 March and 3 June 2026, the conflict between two contending blocs of *Viv Ansanm* gangs caused heightened tensions in several neighbourhoods of the communes of Croix-des-Bouquets and Cité Soleil of the West department. During clashes, residents were caught in the crossfire, hit by bullets inside their homes, or targeted over suspected ties to gangs or to the police. Gang members deliberately burned homes and other buildings, as well as vehicles. They also used sexual violence - especially against women and girls - as punishment for living in areas controlled by rival groups. Public transport, local businesses, and industrial activities came to a standstill¹⁹⁶. Several factors triggered the clashes. Following early 2026 operations in lower Delmas (see Annex 2 of S/2026/241), the Tokyo gang aimed at relocating to Village de la Renaissance (Cité Soleil commune) and re-establishing its operational capacity by setting up a checkpoint along a local road to generate criminal income. Further, on 6 March 2026, after Chen Mechan members killed two Canaan members over Tokyo's relocation, gangs such as 400 Mawozo and Tokyo supported the Canaan gang to confront Chen Mechan, Pierre VI and Terre Noire gangs¹⁹⁷. From 6 to 11 March 2026, at least 74 people were killed, comprising 20 individuals with no reported links to gangs. A further 76 people were injured, including 40 nonassociated with gangs¹⁹⁸.

Chen Mechan then shifted alliance and joined the gangs of 400 Mawozo and Canaan to take control over the territories of Pierre VI and Terre Noire. Another key driver of the clashes was the setup by the Pierre VI gang of an illegal tollbooth along the Duvivier Road, to generate revenue from the extortion of drivers, which displeased Jeff, the leader of Canaan gang¹⁹⁹.

During the first wave of gang violence, from 6 to 18 April, at least 111 women and girls were victims of rape and gang rape. From 19 April to 9 May 2026, renewed gang clashes were driven by the Tokyo gang's efforts to retain its presence in Village de la Renaissance. Sexual violence was also reported in this new peak of violence, with at least 46 women subjected to rape, including gang rape. A third wave of gang violence from 10 May to 3 June 2026 resulted in at least 147 people killed, including 33 people with no reported links to gangs. Several additional casualties were reported²⁰⁰. Intense violence impacted commercial activities and humanitarian operations.

On 21 April 2026, the Barbancourt Rum company stated that part of its sugarcane plantations was destroyed by fire.


¹⁹⁶ Interviews with confidential source and gang analyst, April 2026, Le Nouvelliste, n° 42458, 20 and 21 April 2026 and confidential reports, 2026.

¹⁹⁷ Interviews with confidential source and gang analysts, April 2026

¹⁹⁸ BINUH, Flash Report - Intensification of Gang Violence in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac Area, August 2026. Available at: <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1>

¹⁹⁹ Interviews with confidential source and gang analysts, April 2026

²⁰⁰ BINUH, Flash Report - Intensification of Gang Violence in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac Area, August 2026. Available at: <https://binuh.unmissions.org/en/document-library/flash-report-intensification-of-gang-violence-in-the-plaine-du-cul-de-sac-1>



Between 18 and 19 April 2026, staff from Doctors Without Borders (MSF) was forced to remain inside their homes, and nearly 40 individuals - including staff and their families - took shelter at the MSF hospital in Cité Soleil²⁰¹. Renewed violence from 10 May 2026 led MSF in Cité Soleil to evacuate and temporarily suspend its medical activities²⁰². Several bullets hit different building, and a security guard²⁰³. Several charities and local support services had to close and leave the area²⁰⁴. At least six children's shelters in Sarthe and nearby areas of Cité Soleil were forced to relocate to Delmas. This situation is of concern, considering that the displacement and the disruption of protection services increase risks of recruitment of vulnerable children or re-recruitment of those leaving gangs, while the absence of adequate support makes reintegration unsustainable and heightens the risk of exploitation or renewed involvement in gangs²⁰⁵. As of 15 May 2026, approximately 10,182 individuals had fled the violence²⁰⁶.

Additionally, the heavy crossfire in the vicinity of the international airport posed a recurring risk to both GSF and United Nations personnel, premises and air assets, with an increase in the incidents reported²⁰⁷.

²⁰¹ <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.ca/haiti-the-country-has-become-a-far-more-dangerous-place-to-live-or-seek-medical-care/>

²⁰² See: <https://www.msf.fr/communiqués-presse/haiti-msf-contrainte-d-evacuer-son-hopital-de-cite-soleil-et-d-y-suspendre-temporairement-ses-activites>.

²⁰³ <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haiti-msf-hospital-cite-soleil-reopens-after-three-week-closure>

²⁰⁴ Interviews with representatives of civil society, May 2026.

²⁰⁵ Confidential note, 23 avril 2026.

²⁰⁶ International Organization for Migration (IOM) (15 May 2026). "Emergency Tracking Tool 93.1 – Updates on displacement following armed clashes in Cité Soleil (10 - 15 May 2026)", available at <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-931-updates-displacement-following-armed-clashes-cite-soleil>

²⁰⁷ Confidential report, 30 May 2026.

Context

The Cul-de-Sac Plain area, in the West department, encompasses several communes, including Croix-des-Bouquets, Cité Soleil and Tabarre. It holds critical strategic importance within the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, serving as a key corridor linking the capital to other parts of the country. The Plain also hosts industrial zones, and densely populated neighborhoods and lies near the international airport.

The area witnessed violence of such intensity not seen since at least late 2023²⁰⁸. At that time, *Viv Ansanm* was not yet formed, and gangs integrated the rival alliances, G9 and G-Pèp. In September 2023, the death of G9-leader, Tysson (Carrefour Drouillard gang) triggered clashes in Cité Soleil commune between two G9 camps (Boston, Belekou, Terre Noire and Pierre VI against Chen Mechan and Carrefour Drouillard, supported by the G-Pèp-Brooklyn gang) (see Annex 4 of S/2024/253). Further, in November 2023, the death of Iskar Andrice (a.k.a “Iskar”), leader of the Belekou gang and co-founder of G9 led to the resurgence of further territorial disputes in the area, between G9 and G-Pèp (see para. 28 and Annex 4 of S/2024/253).

While the activation of *Viv Ansanm* alliance in 2024 reduced inter-gang fighting over territorial expansion and shifted focus toward attacks on state institutions and consolidation of strongholds (see section II.A of S/2024/704), sporadic clashes continued among affiliated groups, underscoring persistent internal rivalries and competition over territory and illicit revenue sources. For instance, clashes erupted in June 2025 between the gangs of 400 Mawozo, and Chen Mechan over a checkpoint in Lilavois (Croix-des-Bouquets). Residents were killed in Santo 25 neighborhood, including some who were inside homes that were set on fire by 400 Mawozo gang members²⁰⁹.

After a relative decrease in violence in Croix-des-Bouquets reportedly due to the relocation of many 400 Mawozo members to the Centre and Artibonite departments²¹⁰, the beginning of March 2026 marked an escalation of violence in the area. Following the destabilization of the Tokyo gang (led by Ralph Woodmyr Louissant, a.k.a “Chalè”) – which lost territory after intensified police operations in early 2026 (see section II.A and Annex 2 of S/2026/241) - the gangs of Canaan and 400 Mawozo initially supported the establishment of the Tokyo gang in the area of Village de la Renaissance, in the Croix-des-Bouquets commune. While Chen Mechan was initially aligned with Pierre VI and Terre Noire to oppose this move, the gangs of Canaan and 400 Mawozo ultimately persuaded Chen Mechan to extend its control over areas held by Pierre VI and Terre Noire gangs²¹¹.

Residents and local stakeholders deplored the absence of police in the area, despite the proximity of the conflicts to police headquarters²¹². On 29 April 2026, a group of private companies whose facilities are located near the site of the attacks, denounced critical conditions of the National Road #1 (RN1) and the Route 9, which hinders effective police operations. Economic stakeholders - whose companies account for thousands of direct and indirect jobs - then urged Haitian authorities, on 30 April 2026, to rehabilitate these strategic sections and the access to the international airport, as well as to reassert control over the area, and protect the population. They emphasized the economic and social importance of their activities and highlighted the risk of the area becoming a new ‘lost territory’, on the doorstep of the international airport and the HNP headquarters²¹³.

Several on-the-ground police operations - with the first taking place only on 28 March 2026 - and one Task Force drone operation were launched. Further, on 5 June 2026, a truce was agreed amongst *Viv Ansanm* gangs including the reduction of armed presence (removing checkpoints, watchtowers, and barricades), the specific control of zones and the end of fighting. According to the agreement, the Fourgy area, in Cité Soleil, would remain a neutral and non-aggression zone,

²⁰⁸ Interview with confidential source, 23 April 2026.

²⁰⁹ BINUH/Human Rights Division: Quarterly report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, April - June 2025. Available at: https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_report_on_the_human_rights_situation_in_haiti_april_-_june_2025.pdf

²¹⁰ BINUH/Human Rights Division: Quarterly report on the Human Rights Situation in Haiti, July - September 2025. Available at: <https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28july%20%E2%80%93september%202025%29.pdf>

²¹¹ Interview with gang analyst, April 2026 and Le Nouvelliste, n° 42458 | Lundi 20 et mardi 21 avril 2026.

²¹² Interviews with confidential sources, April 2026.

²¹³ Statements by private companies, 2026.

while Village de la Renaissance was officially handed over to the Tokyo gang. Although Jeff Canaan subsequently reopened the Route 9 that had been closed, Chen Mechan continued to clash with Terre Noire. The situation remains volatile²¹⁴.

This surge in violence is driven by gang competition over the control of key routes linking the Cul-de-Sac Plain to Cité Soleil, which serve as critical corridor for trucks heading notably northwards. The clashes also raised questions about the internal cohesion of *Viv Ansanm* and political drivers backing gangs' motivations, particularly ahead of electoral period.

Some sources suggested that beyond territorial expansion for economic interests, the underlying drivers that led to the constitution of former *G9 an Fanmi e Alye* (G9) and G-Pèp (see S/2023/674) remain active²¹⁵. The Cité Soleil coalition is essentially composed of G9 gangs while the Croix-des-Bouquets group is made up of G-Pèp ones, notably the 400 Mawozo and Canaan gangs. However, the heavy infighting likely reflects the expansionist ambitions of the Canaan and 400 Mawozo gangs as they push into the Plain after securing key areas in the Centre and North departments²¹⁶ (see section II.A.3 of S/2025/597).

²¹⁴ Interviews with gang analyst, Cité Soleil and Croix-des-Bouquets residents and workers, June 2026.

²¹⁵ Interviews with gang analysts, police officers, representatives of civil society, local authorities, and humanitarian workers, May and June 2026.

²¹⁶ Interviews with gang analysts, May and June 2026.

Annex 13 – Sustained gang violence in Kenscoff²¹⁷

More than a year and a half since the first large-scale attack against Kenscoff, on 27 January 2025 (see Annex 6 of S/2025/597), insecurity persists in Kenscoff's communal sections, even if some areas in the centre appear relatively calm. Gangs continue to maintain a persistent presence in localities such as Nouvelle-Touraine, Bongars, Grand Fond, Belle Fontaine, Belot, Furcy, Kafou Bèt, and Sourçailles. To make matters worse, amid intensified security operations, gangs continue to infiltrate the commune - particularly through a direct corridor from Carrefour commune to Kenscoff - to take refuge in the most remote communal sections where access is extremely difficult and gangs have cut off roads²¹⁸.

According to sources, there has only been one major police operation in 2025 (see paragraph 47 of S/2025/597), and it yielded no results. Since then, security interventions remain largely reactive, achieving limited tactical successes, and not resulting in sustained territorial recovery. Gangs maintain their presence in rural and elevated out of reach areas, to move freely and prepare attacks. While no permanent security presence remains to control secondary axes, gangs quickly use them to reinsert themselves (see Annex 6 of S/2025/597).

Multiple calls have urged the national authorities to provide the police with assets such as helicopters, motorcycles, and terrain-adapted vehicles, as well as sustained capabilities for territorial consolidation. Sources interviewed by the Panel call for units capable of operating off-road, at high altitude and at night - as attacks systematically occur between midnight and early morning - and in mountainous terrain.

The communal sections - the source of agriculture for the municipality - have been devastated by gangs. For instance, Bongars was overrun by gangs on 21 January 2025, resulting in 279 people killed, 500 residences burnt and the displacement of thousands of residents. As for the Nouvelle Touraine communal section, it is fully under gang control, that arrived on the locality on 3 March 2025. The police and State are totally absent, and gangs have carried out massacres, looted everything, destroyed livelihoods and 90% of the population has fled Nouvelle Touraine. Gangs have also controlled local markets through an illegal arrangement whereby people have to give 50% of everything they sell to gangs. Livestock is valued at approximately \$ 4,000 HTG for goats, \$ 6,000 HTG for pigs, and \$ 80,000 USD for cattle, of which half must be surrendered to gangs. In the case of vegetables, they sometimes seize the entire production²¹⁹.

The Panel interviewed farmers that were driven out of their land by violence and have lost everything. Having depended on agriculture for their survival, they now struggle in difficult conditions in other parts of the capital, as their entire way of life was destroyed.

In early July 2026, coordinated attacks by *Viv Ansanm* triggered a new wave of violence in Kenscoff, from the night of 4 to 5 July at least until 8 July 2026, beginning in Téléco, Le Refuge, and Viard (Nouvelle Touraine communal section), before spreading on 8 July to several other localities, including Robin, Mahotièrè, Dumisseau, Do Blanc, Bernard 1 and 2, Do Pak, Kabamòn, and Dè Savann (Grand Fond communal section), with the escalation resulting in widespread destruction, kidnapping and killings. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), approximately 5,840 people were displaced as a result²²⁰. Sources on the ground described the attacks as one of the most violent ones in the reporting period, leading to the death of at least 61 residents killed, although interviews with residents suggested a significantly higher death toll. The municipal authorities have buried at least 43 bodies²²¹.

Gangs in Kenscoff

At least four gangs are present in Kenscoff, each represented by a local leader. They collaborate closely when needed. Izo 2 is a representative of the 5 Segond gang, led by Johnson Andre (a.k.a "Izo", HTi.002). While several sources identify Izo 2 and Dady Paul, known as Frantz Valmyr (a.k.a "Didy") as the same individual, some local sources indicated that Didy is originally from Furcy, leads his own gang, and is another 'general' of *Viv Ansanm*. Didy controls the area of the Téléco site - an essential telecommunications hub providing signal support for civil aviation, internet, media, and public safety

²¹⁷ This annex is based on interviews with local authorities, residents, victims, gang analysts, 2025 and 2026.

²¹⁸ Interviews with local authority and residents, 2025 and 2026. See also:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATsTVoDo4Rs>

²¹⁹ Interviews with residents, May 2026.

²²⁰ <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-1001-updates-displacements-following-armed-attacks?utm>

²²¹ Interviews with gang analyst and residents, 2026.

operations throughout Haiti -, Furcy, Tête K-Jacques, and the road leading to Seguin. Blanco is a member of the Ti Bwa gang, led by Christ-Roi Chery (a.k.a “Chrisla”), and controls the Belot area. Barak is linked to the Grand Ravine gang led by Renel Destina (a.k.a “Ti Lapli”, HTi.003). Wilson Joseph (a.k.a “Lanmo San Jou”, HTi.004), head of the 400 Mawozo gang had also sent gang members to Kenscoff, at the beginning of the conflict, in early January 2025, but many of them were killed by the police²²².

During the 27 January 2026 attack, residents estimate that nearly 3,000 gang members were mobilised, but currently, this figure has decreased, as some gang members were killed by security operations and self-defense groups while others - being non-local and unable to adapt to the cold and mountainous conditions - have left the area. Local sources estimate that nearly 1,500 of them are present in Kenscoff, mostly locally recruited²²³.

Sustained gang violence in Kenscoff commune²²⁴

During the reporting period, Kenscoff continued to face sustained violence.

On 11 October 2025, gang members set fire to the Camp Zoï rural hotel and the Wynne Farm Ecological Reserve, which offers camping services, cultivation and reforestation workshops, and other environmental protection training activities.

On 5 November 2025, in Fermathe 56, gang members fired at a group of people, killing two persons and injuring two men.

On 27 December 2025, gang members fired at a group of farmers heading to their fields in Galette, killing at least two members of the population and severely injuring two others.

In early January 2026, the 400 Mawozo and 5 Second gangs attacked the localities of Fort-Jacques and Viard, as they were confronted by self-defence groups.

On 11 February 2026, gang members killed at least one person and burnt several homes. Earlier attacks on 29 January and 8 February in K-Jacques had already caused at least seven fatalities and several kidnappings.

On 21 February 2026, in Nouvelle-Touraine, gangs set fire to a vehicle with employees of the telecommunications company Natcom, in the Morne Tranchant area. Two employees were killed and another injured. In Belle Fontaine, between 7 and 8 March 2026, gangs operating around Tête K-Jacques, carried out large-scale thefts of livestock belonging to farmers. They moved from Tête K-Jacques crossing into Gélin, a small community above the town of Kenscoff, setting houses on fire. Many farmers were robbed of their animals, at least three people lost their lives during these attacks, not including other unreported cases, according to a media interview of the mayor of Kenscoff, on 11 March²²⁵. Gélin, located in the 4th communal section of Belle Fontaine, has been reported as important for gangs for the transport of drugs²²⁶.

²²² Interviews with residents, March and April 2026.

²²³ Interviews with residents, 2025 and 2026.

²²⁴ This section is based on interviews with residents, 2025 and 2026 as well as on BINUH Quarterly Report on the Human Rights situation, October-December 2025. Available at: https://binuh.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/Quarterly%20Report%20on%20the%20human%20rights%20situation%20in%20Haiti%20%28October%20-%20December%202025%29%20-%20ENGLISH_0.pdf and confidential reports, 2026.

²²⁵ Interview with local authority on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATsTVoDo4Rs>

²²⁶ Interview with resident of affected area, March 2026.

Gangs burned several houses belonging to residents of the mountains area of Gelin

Still from video shared on social media, on 7 March 2026



<https://www.facebook.com/share/1B2UsWjG62/>

On 12 March 2026, gangs set fire to a site housing a communication antenna, belonging to Digicel, located near the Téléco site. Some weeks before, seven employees – including an Irish missionary - and a 3-year-old child were kidnapped by the gang of Didy from the orphanage located near the Téléco site. They were released nearly a month later.

12 March 2026 arson attack against a communication antenna site



Stills from video shared on social media, March 2026.

<https://x.com/chantalmelie/status/2032253354282193077?s=12&t=3kFgrKDPT9SeorO5dwAnew>

HNP intervention



Direction de Communication de la Police (DICOP)



COMMUNIQUÉ DE PRESSE

Kenscoff : assaut déjoué par les forces de l'ordre, les assaillants se sont enfuis

Kenscoff, Samedi 14 mars 2026 - Dans la nuit du 11 au 12 mars 2026, aux environs de 1 heure du matin, la Police Nationale d'Haïti (PNH) a réalisé une intervention décisive sur les hauteurs de Kenscoff. Alertées en urgence suite à l'incendie criminel d'une antenne de la compagnie Digicel, située dans les parages du site de la Téléco, plusieurs unités spécialisées ont été immédiatement déployées sur les lieux pour faire face à des individus lourdement armés qui saccageaient les installations.

Dès leur arrivée, les agents de la Team Kilo ont procédé à l'enlèvement rapide des barricades érigées par les criminels, permettant ainsi un accès fluide aux forces de l'ordre.



Source: HNP Facebook page, March 2026. See: <https://web.facebook.com/pnh.ht>

In April 2026, during a media interview, the Mayor of Kenscoff reported other attacks, including in Belle-Fontaine communal section, in the locality of Nankoupé. Gang members killed livestock and stole three goats during the day²²⁷.

On 1 April 2026, in Viard, two victims were shot by gang members along a road.

On 1 May 2026, two men were killed and their bodies set on fire during an armed attack, in Malong, a locality in Sourçailles²²⁸.

At the time of drafting, attacks were still ongoing in Kenscoff.

²²⁷ <https://www.facebook.com/reel/834758695622452>

²²⁸ <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/266896/two-killed-one-missing-in-fresh-armed-attack-in-kenscoff>

Annex 14 - Warrant notices for Alfredo Antoine and Nenel Cassy

 POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE AVIS DE RECHERCHE  NOM : ANTOINE PRENOM : ALFREDO INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES: ▪ COMLOT CONTRE LA SURETE INTERIEURE DE L'ETAT ▪ FINANCEMENT DES ORGANISATIONS CRIMINELLES ▪ COMPLICITÉ D'ASSASSINAT ▪ ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS N.B. Dangereux et Armé <i>En cas de localisation</i> Prière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573 février 2025	 POLICE NATIONALE D'HAÏTI DIRECTION CENTRALE DE LA POLICE JUDICIAIRE AVIS DE RECHERCHE  NOM : CASSY PRENOM : NENEL INFRACTIONS REPROCHÉES: ▪ COMLOT CONTRE LA SURETE INTERIEURE DE L'ETAT ▪ FINANCEMENT DES ORGANISATIONS CRIMINELLES ▪ COMPLICITÉ D'ASSASSINAT ▪ ASSOCIATION DE MALFAITEURS N.B. Dangereux et Armé <i>En cas de localisation</i> Prière d'appeler aux numéros : 3834-1111 / 3836-1111 / 3837-1111 / 3838/1111/ 2817-0545 / 3106-0573 février 2025
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Source: HNP Facebook page, February 2025. See: <https://web.facebook.com/pnh.ht>

Annex 15 - Coordinated attacks by *Viv Ansanm* across the lower Artibonite: over 100 residents killed²²⁹

Almost two years after the Pont-Sondé massacre (see paras. 36-37 of S/2025/356 and special report submitted in November 2024), *Viv Ansanm* launched a new wave of coordinated attacks in the lower Artibonite region of the Artibonite department.

Between 29 March and 3 April 2026, gangs of the *Viv Ansanm* alliance - Gran Grif (HTe.001), led by Luckson Elan (HTi.007), Kokorat San Ras, led by Bendjy, and Canaan, headed by Jeff Larose - perpetrated a series of coordinated attacks across at least 16 localities in the lower Artibonite region, notably in the communes of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite, Marchand Dessalines and Montrouis, resulting in at least 95 residents killed and 38 others injured²³⁰. However, the number of people killed and injured is higher, as the gangs continued their attacks over successive days²³¹. About 9,000 residents were displaced between 28 March and 1 April 2026²³².

The assaults occurred in the early hours of the day - between 02:00 and 08:00 - while residents were at home. Several victims were shot dead after being forcibly taken from their beds or killed or injured while attempting to flee. Several houses were burned²³³. In a single day - 29 March 2026 - at least 67 residents (38 men and 29 women) were killed, and 30 others (17 men and 13 women) were injured during coordinated attacks carried out by the Gran Grif gang in the communes of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite and Marchand Dessalines²³⁴.

1. Context

The department of Artibonite - once considered Haiti's agricultural breadbasket in Northern Haiti - has become one of the most alarming centres of gang violence. The rise of gangs like Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras (between 2015 and 2017) drove increased insecurity through 2020, followed by a temporary decline in early 2021 after the death of the Gran Grif leader, Odma Louissaint. From March 2022, the human rights situation deteriorated sharply.²³⁵ According to local sources²³⁶, the intensification of violence was also marked by the attack by Gran Grif in January 2023 against the Liancourt police station, in which six officers were killed (see para. 68 of S/2023/674).

The region has faced increasing violence not only from Gran Grif (HTe.001), led by Luckson Elan (HTi.007) but also from Kokorat San Ras, led by Bendjy, as well as from gangs coming from the capital, namely Canaan, led by Jeff Larose (a.k.a "Jeff"), and 400 Mawozo, led by Lanmo San Jou (HTi. 004), who advanced into the lower Artibonite, after seizing strategic towns in the centre department in April 2025 (see S/2025/597).

To collectively oppose gang activities, since late 2025, around 30 self-defence groups distributed across the department united into a coalition, called the Lower Artibonite Coalition. The latter is led by Francky Pierre, a.k.a "Ti Mèpri", and its membership totals roughly 300 individuals. Ti Mèpri is also responsible for the *Coalition des révolutionnaires pour sauver l'Artibonite* (known as the Jean Denis coalition), based in the locality of Jean Denis (Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite commune). The group - considered by many interlocutors as a gang rather than a self-defence group, since it regularly commits human rights violations including the killing of inhabitants and burning of properties - was formed to resist the activities of Gran Grif gang,²³⁷ that exponentially enlarged its area of control and influence since 2022 (see para. 49 of S/2023/674).

²²⁹ This annex is based on interviews with individuals with direct experience in gang-controlled areas in Artibonite, police officers, local authorities in lower Artibonite, civil society representatives, victims of attacks in Artibonite, member of self-defence group, as well as confidential report, 2026; *Centre d'Analyse et de Recherche en Droits de l'Homme* (CARDH) report, 1 April 2026; confidential reports, March-April 2026.

²³⁰ Confidential report, April 2026.

²³¹ Interviews with local authorities, police officer, and residents, 2026.

²³² <https://dtm.iom.int/reports/haiti-emergency-tracking-tool-881-updates-displacement-following-armed-attacks-petite>

²³³ Interview with representative civil society working in the lower Artibonite, April 2026

²³⁴ Confidential report, 2026

²³⁵ OHCHR report, Criminal violence extends beyond Port-au-Prince: the situation in Lower Artibonite from January 2022 to October 2023, November 2023. Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/haiti/Haiti-report-criminal-violence-artibonite-2023-EN.pdf>

²³⁶ Interviews with local authority and with individual with direct experience in gang-controlled areas in Artibonite, April 2026.

²³⁷ *Idem*.

These attacks are part of a broader strategy to expand control across the lower part of the Artibonite region, not only by gangs (for revenue collection), but also by politicians. Control over the region is politically significant because it is a densely populated and economically important region. For political actors seeking to gain or maintain power, securing influence in this area can translate into control over key electoral districts, local authorities, and logistical routes. Gang networks, in turn, have historically become instruments that assert their territorial dominance to shape political dynamics.

1.1. Escalation of tension between Gran Grif gang and the Lower Artibonite Coalition

Given the proximity of the locality of Jean Denis to Savien locality (stronghold of Gran Grif), both areas have become hotspots of violence, with frequent clashes between Gran Grif and Jean Denis coalition²³⁸. Several recent developments have heightened tensions between the two groups, prompting Gran Grif's chief, Luckson Elan (HTi.007), to plan coordinated attacks not only in Jean Denis area but also across localities where members of the Lower Artibonite Coalition are present²³⁹.

Repeated seizures of weapons and ammunition intended for Gran Grif by the coalition reportedly prompted the launch of attacks. For instance, on 3 August 2025, nine boxes of ammunition intended for the Gran Grif gang was seized by the Coalition (see Annex 19).

Another key factor significantly contributing to the onset of the attacks was the establishment by the Jean Denis Coalition of a checkpoint in Carrefour Kado, at the entrance of the city, in 2025; where informants sent by Gran Grif gang or individuals suspected of having links with the gang have been frequently intercepted and killed by its members²⁴⁰. For instance, on 28 March 2026, on the eve of the massacre, two women were killed at the Jean Denis Coalition's checkpoint, after being accused of purchasing supplies - fabric - for the gang in Pont-Sondé market²⁴¹. In addition, the set-up of roadblocks by self-defence groups across the lower Artibonite has constrained Gran Grif's revenue, which is largely dependent on extorting vehicles and travellers, thus fuelling discontent of its leader.

1.2 Threats of attacks by Gran Grif gang leader

From early March 2026, Luckson Elan was openly threatening to eliminate the Jean Denis Coalition and to seize control of the commune of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite²⁴².

Through an audio message, Luckson Elan vowed to devastate the entire lower Artibonite region in search for members of the Lower Artibonite Coalition, and particularly Ti Mèpri. He also said that any areas that dare to harbour them will be razed to the ground²⁴³.

2. Kenken as a key actor of the attacks

Kenken a.k.a "chat 2 pye" (meaning *char d'assaut blindé sur deux pieds*, or one-man assault machine), a key member of Gran Grif, can be seen in live videos related to the attacks, alongside the second chief of the gang, Wender Choisy (a.k.a "Dèdè"). Kenken is a former member of the Lower Artibonite Coalition, and switched side to become a Gran Grif gang member in October 2025, reportedly because the gang has greater resources²⁴⁴. He was one of the coordinators of the attacks and violently confronted the population, as he knows the areas intimately. Residents connected to gangs were also used to supply information about certain areas.

²³⁸ Interview with gang analyst, 3 April 2026.

²³⁹ Interview with gang analyst, 24 April 2026.


²⁴⁰ *Idem*.

²⁴¹ Interviews with gang analyst, April 2026 and individual with direct experience in gang-controlled areas in Artibonite, April 2026, and confidential report, 10 April 2026.

²⁴² *Idem*, and other confidential report, 2026.

²⁴³ Audio message shared with the Panel on 3 April 2026 and interview with gang analyst, April 2026.

²⁴⁴ Interviews with resident in Artibonite with direct experience in gang-controlled areas, and gang analyst, April 2026.

Kenken (with weapon raised) leading a group of gang members (likely including minors)*Stills from video shared on social media, April 2026***Gran Grif gang members on live videos about the attacks**

Gran Grif members on live video with Kenken (in the bottom right corner)

Wender Choisy (a.k.a “Dèdè”), second chief of Gran Grif (on the left) and Kenken

Stills from videos shared on social media, April 2026

3. Evolution of the attacks

3.1. 29 March 2026: initial round of attacks by Gran Grif gang

On 29 March 2026, four groups of Gran Grif gang members of about 50 each, including several minors, well-armed and equipped with telephones and radio handsets undertook coordinated attacks against at least 10 localities in the communes of Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite and Marchand Dessalines, between 2:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.²⁴⁵ They also used live videos to facilitate coordination.

In the commune of the Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, Jean Denis was among the first localities targeted. Ti Mèpri’s coalition attempted to repel the attacks; however, outnumbered and outgunned, its members withdrew. During clashes, four members

²⁴⁵ Interview with individual with direct experience in gang-controlled area, 17 April 2026.

of the Coalition were killed. Residents were forcibly removed from their beds and shot dead, or fled into nearby fields. The assailants burned several houses²⁴⁶. Simultaneously, other groups carried out coordinated attacks on multiple areas, including Négriel, Boulin and Rémonsins, where over 20 people were killed and dozens were injured. Other communities including Manglouet, Blain and Sédrène also scored a heavy toll of victims. The commune of Marchand Dessalines was further attacked, at around 7:00 a.m., where Gran Grif members made more victims in Bois-Jour.

The attackers had also previously blocked access to routes to prevent the security forces from intervening²⁴⁷.



3.2. 30 March 2026: the communes of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite and Montrouis respectively attacked by Gran Grif and Canaan gangs

On 30 March 2026, in the Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite commune, between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., members of the Gran Grif gang attacked Beaufort, Védry, and Rémonsins. In Beaufort and Védry, two men were killed inside their homes while 25 houses were burned.

In the meantime, in Montrouis commune, at around 2:00 a.m., members of the Canaan gang attacked the village of Vidon Piâtre, where 10 people were shot dead inside their homes, and 20 houses were set alight. Two members of the Piâtre self-defence brigade were also shot dead in a clash with members of the Canaan gang. Their bodies were burned.

3.2. Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras join forces to seize the commune of Marchand Dessalines

Gran Grif capitalized on the momentum of the attacks over Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite to extend its presence throughout Marchand Dessalines commune. Therefore, on 31 March 2026, at around 6:00 a.m., members of the gang attacked the villages of Pont-Jour and Carrefour Roger. While attempting to flee, residents were killed and people injured inside their homes. Over twenty houses were set alight after being looted in Bois-Jour and Carrefour Roger. During this attack, a member of the Barrage self-defence brigade was shot dead and decapitated with a machete, and his body was burned.

²⁴⁶ Confidential report, April 2026.


²⁴⁷ <https://lenouvelliste.com/article/265845/attaque-meurtriere-du-gang-gran-grif-a-jean-denis-racontee-par-des-residents>

Gran Grif members in the Ponjou Market, on 31 March 2026*Stills from video shared on social media, 31 March 2026.*

To secure control over areas of Marchand Dessalines, the Gran Grif gang entered in an arrangement with its ally, the Kokorat San Ras gang, led by Bendjy. The arrangement reportedly encompassed targeting localities where members of the Lower Artibonite Coalition were believed to be present, but refrained from conducting armed operations in downtown, since it hosts a significant number of relatives and affiliates of Kokorat San Ras.


On 31 March 2026, Bendjy was seen moving in downtown Marchand Dessalines throwing banknotes to residents, aiming at “reassuring” inhabitants that no harm would be inflicted by the gangs²⁴⁸.

²⁴⁸ Interviews with police officer, individual working on gang dynamics in Artibonite, and gang analyst, March and Arpil 2026.



Later, on 1 April 2026, in a symbolic assertion of control, Bendjy and members of both gangs converged at the statue of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, in Marchand Dessalines. Bendjy stated that neither Kokorat San Ras nor Gran Grif had any issues with residents, but that both gangs would kill all members of self-defense groups and anyone hosting or collaborating with them.

Bendjy, leader of the Kokorat San Ras gang (masked) and members of Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif, at the foot of the Dessalines statue




Stills from videos shared on social media, April 2026.

Other attacks were reported on 2 and 3 April 2026, both in Marchand Dessalines (including Carrefour Roger and Ti Bois) as well as in localities of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite (including Bois-Laville and Dézile), with further killings and burning of properties.

The road leading to the Marchand-Dessalines area was cut off by Kokorat San Ras gang.

Following a series of attacks, at the time of writing, the commune of Marchand Dessalines is under full control of Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif gangs.

Blockage of the road leading to Marchand Dessalines by the Kokorat San Ras gang



Source: Photograph shared on social media, in May 2026.

The situation in the commune of Marchand Dessalines remains critical, with escalating threats and violence, with Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif carrying out repeated abuses and public displays of force.

On 5 May 2026, between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m., these gangs had the time to use sledgehammers and destroy the local police station in Marchand Dessalines²⁴⁹.

Marchand Dessalines has effectively become a base of operations for these gangs, allowing them to act freely. As a result, the commune is now largely under their control, forcing residents to flee²⁵⁰.

²⁴⁹ <https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/267005/gangs-destroy-police-station-in-marchand-dessalines>

²⁵⁰ Interviews with gang analyst, May 2026.


Further developments

Many other localities have been targeted by Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras. In just one week, in mid-April 2026, around six people were shot dead, and ten others were injured, in the commune of Marchand Dessalines²⁵¹.

On 1 May 2026, the Gran Grif gang, reportedly supported by elements of the Kokorat San Ras gang, launched another attack against the locality of Jean-Denis, targeting the Jean Denis Coalition. Clashes left multiple people dead and others injured, while numerous homes were burned and residents fled²⁵².

Worrying reports, audio messages and videos have circulated on social media suggesting many other attacks. In several videos, Kenken can be seen attacking different localities. In the Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite commune, he led a group of Gran Grif members to attack the locality of Pitray, on 1 May 2026.

At the time of writing, violence continues.



In other video, he appears showing his weapon, which he then passes to other gang members, who fire it, while they say: "Danger is around / all around us... Death is right before our eyes".

²⁵¹ Interview with individual working on gang dynamics in Artibonite, and gang analyst, March and April 2026.

²⁵² <https://realiteinfo.com/attaque-a-savien-plusieurs-morts-et-des-maisons-incendiees-dans-une-nouvelle-flambee-de-violence/>

Kenken showing his weapon and passing it to other gang members to shoot



Source: Stills from video shared on social media, in May 2026.

Blockage of the National Road #1(RN1)

In the context of the broader escalation of violence in the lower Artibonite region and the absence of police response, on 20 April 2026, Ti Méri, the leader of the Lower Artibonite Coalition, appeared in front of a truck blocking the RN1, a few weeks after the attacks, in the Troi-Pont locality. He stated that it will remain closed until the government decides to dismantle the gangs in Artibonite. He also asked for proper drones, that can be effectively deployed to ‘the right places’.

Ti Méri blocking the RN1



Stills from video shared on social media, on 20 April 2026

Traffic has come to a halt also on other stretches of the road, with blockage by trucks in the villages of Saint-Marc and in L'Estère communes, as part of protests organised by civil society organisations and self-defence groups.

4. Response from the authorities

Following the first attacks, the police deployed two armoured vehicles from the Patchwal sub-station to Jean Denis on the morning of 29 March 2026, which left after few hours. The following day, while gang members returned to Jean Denis, the

deployment of two armoured vehicles in the early morning temporarily restored calm; however, significant loss of life and damage to property had already occurred.

Local police face significant operational constraints, including insufficient firepower, a lack of heavy armoured vehicles and air support, limited specialized personnel, and inadequate access to surveillance technology. Maintenance capacity is also severely limited. In addition, a large proportion of armoured vehicles are out of service, sometimes due to minor technical issues that require intervention from Port-au-Prince. Operational effectiveness is further hindered by centralized decision-making, as joint actions with supporting forces depend on authorization from higher authorities²⁵³.

The situation is further complicated by allegations of collusion between certain police officers supplying gangs with weapons and ammunition and providing them with information on security operations, undermining the effectiveness of security efforts (see Annex 19).

Local authorities and the population vividly deplored the delayed reaction of the government and the lack of a robust response. This highlights not only the absence of effective state protection but also that a cycle of massacres has taken place in total impunity, reinforcing a climate of fear and insecurity.

Interviews with the police in Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite also highlighted the security gap left by the departure of the MSS forces from the area. Since their withdrawal, gangs have advanced, particularly in Savien, Jean Denis, Barrage, Carrefour Paye, and along the road to the commune of L'Estère. According to the police, both Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif are well equipped in terms of personnel and resources, while the police remain unable to conduct operations due to limited resources and insufficient staffing²⁵⁴.

On 8 May 2026, the HNP, supported by the Task Force, conducted operations in the lower Artibonite region, particularly in Jean-Denis, killing around thirty gang members and seizing weapons. However, the following day, on 9 May 2026, six people were killed by members of the Gran Grif gang in the Robert district of the municipality of Saint Marc. They also stole seven motorcycles. The incident occurred following an attack by the gang in the area. Nine people were also wounded by gunfire and three motorcycles were set alight²⁵⁵.

Victims of the Gran Grif attack against Robert locality, in Saint Marc commune, on 9 May 2026
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Gruesome images

<i>Photographs and still from video shared with the Panel, on 9 May 2026.</i>

Other security operations also targeted areas such as Savien and La Croix-Périssette, and key routes in the Artibonite Valley, including raids on gang strongholds.

²⁵³ Interview with local authorities and police officer, May 2026.

²⁵⁴ Interview with police officer, 4 May 2026.

²⁵⁵ Interviews with resident of Saint-Marc and with gang analyst, 9 May 2026.

Situation in Saint Marc commune

Saint-Marc consistently targeted by gangs due to its strategic importance

Saint-Marc is the second-largest city in the Artibonite department and a major port town with relatively developed infrastructure. Its economy is largely driven by locally produced agricultural goods, while also attracting significant interest from members of the diaspora and a wide range of economic stakeholders. The city holds strategic importance due to its role as a key transport hub linking Port-au-Prince with the Artibonite and northern regions. Its position along major road networks, combined with its port facilities and economic activity, makes it a critical centre for trade, logistics, and regional mobility.

Saint-Marc thus became a major refuge for residents fleeing gang violence and a pressure point, while gangs have been ultimately targeting to seize this strategic commune. Not only Gran Grif but also the gang of Canaan want to extend their territory up to Saint Marc to increase criminal revenues. However, they have met the strong resistance of residents, transporters, local merchants and self-defense groups, who are seeking to secure road access for their goods from the port of Saint Marc to the other regions.

According to a local authority of Saint-Marc, the commune is surrounded by gangs which have taken over Montrouis, La Chapelle, Marchand Dessalines, and Liancourt, as well as the first and second sections of Petite-Rivière de l'Artibonite. In addition, Saint-Marc is becoming saturated, as it has received many people displaced from neighbouring communes²⁵⁶.

In the case of Montrouis, a local authority explained to the Panel that, since October 2025, gang members faced no resistance to infiltrate the town, coming from the coast, the RN1 and the mountain areas. They operate freely, with each locality under the control of a designated leader. In this touristic area, they move at their will, looting major hotels, vacation homes, churches, and Vodoo temples. The population almost entirely displaced to other areas, such as Saint-Marc and Archaie communes²⁵⁷.

Local authorities and residents fear attacks against the commune of Saint-Marc, notably following the alliance between Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras, which has led to the control of Marchand Dessalines. In this way, outraged by the violence, residents and notably victims of the violence in Jean Denis locality, organized a protest, early May 2026, to call on concrete action from the authorities to dismantle the gangs that are terrorising several areas in the region. Participants erected barricades using burning tires and vehicles in several neighbourhoods, and on the RN1, bringing traffic to a complete standstill. As a result, commercial and school activities were suspended.

Tensions escalated while police intervened to disperse the crowd. Two people, including a 16-year-old boy, lost their lives due to police actions. Several others were injured, and people were affected by heavy use of tear gas²⁵⁸. While condemning acts of violence by the population during protests, such as burning tires, vehicles, or property – including the office of the Directorate General of Taxes (*Direction Générale des Impôts* - DGI) - the population deplored the disproportional use of force against protestors.

Amid worsening security conditions, on 5 May 2026, local authorities in Saint-Marc imposed a 72-hour curfew across the municipality. The measure restricts night-time movement and requires police authorization for public gatherings, with participants identified²⁵⁹.

²⁵⁶ Interview with local authority of Saint-Marc, April 2026.

²⁵⁷ Interview with local authority, 28 April 2026.

²⁵⁸ Interview with human rights analyst, May 2026.

²⁵⁹ Statement from the municipal government of Saint-Marc, 5 May 2026.

Office of the Directorate General of Taxes set on fire



One of the three demonstrators killed by police officers

Gruesome image

Sources: Stills from video and photograph shared with the Panel, on 4 May 2026.

Security forces in Saint-Marc are insufficient and under-resourced, while gangs remain constantly on the offensive, and have increased capacity. As in other communes of the lower Artibonite, residents have organized themselves and worked alongside the police in an effort to stop them.

The MSS base established in Pont Sondé in 2024 proved relatively useful as a deterrent, but it fell short of local expectations in terms of supporting security forces to reclaiming territory occupied by gangs. On the contrary, gangs have increased capacity, continuing to attack frequently. Local authorities deplored the absence of the government response to the major attacks²⁶⁰.

At the time of the drafting, Saint-Marc commune remains under threat of gang attacks.

²⁶⁰ Interview with local authority of Saint-Marc, April 2026.

Annex 16: Seizures conducted at Haiti's ports of entry or on their way to Haiti between the adoption of resolution 2356 on 22 October 2022 and 1st July 2026

Date	Location/ authorities	Firearms	Ammunition	Other materiel	Information
25 October 2022	Miami Airport USA	9mm handgun		1 magazine	The pistol was discovered in a parcel being shipped to Haiti
8 November 2022	Elias Pina, Dominican Republic		12,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm 10,160 rounds of 5.56x45mm		Two Haitian women were arrested while attempting to cross the border into Haiti in a private vehicle.
31 December 2022	Cap-Haitien Haiti		989 rounds of 9x19mm		Seizure from a container coming from the US. One individual was arrested in Haiti.
11 January 2023	Miami port USA	One revolver	41 rounds		The revolver was concealed in a sofa
24 April 2023	Cap-Haitien Haiti	One 9mm handgun	Eight 9mm rounds 4 boxes of 12-gauge rounds (100 rounds)	2 knives	Found in a container transported by the Sara Express coming from the Miami River (Antillean Marine Shipping).
7 June 2023	CPS container park– Port au Prince Haiti	PA-15 5.56mm rifle	340 rounds of 5.56x45mm 115 rounds of 9mm	5 magazines 1 helmet	Container coming from Miami. Some materiel concealed in a popcorn machine. The rifle was purchased for the first time in the US in 2017. Two individuals arrested in Haiti.
2023 (unknown date)	Miami USA	2 pistols		1 magazine	
2023 (unknown date)	Miami USA			23 vests	
18 October 2023	Dajabon , Dominican Republic		1,850 rounds of 9mm		A minor was intercepted while trying to exit the DR
1 November 2023	Miami USA	1 revolver 357 Magnum	5 rounds of S&W .40 cal 36 rounds of 9x19mm		Commercial Vessel
30 November 2023	Miami USA			'35 cannon L-1 37mm' [the Panel was not able to identify what exact item it is]	Commercial aircraft
2 December 2023	International Airport Haiti		50 rounds of .45 40 rounds of 5.56x45mm 150 rounds of 9x19mm 25 of 12 gauge cartridges	19,390 USD in cash Six radios One video surveillance system One flak jacket	Passenger arriving from NY on commercial aircraft
22 December 2023	Cap Haitien Haiti	9mm handgun 5.56x45mm rifle	92 rounds of 9mm 9 rounds of .45 78 rounds of 5.56x45mm	3 flak jackets 1 helmet 7 magazines	Seizure from container from Florida Serial number of the handgun was erased
05 April 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti	Nine 5.56x45mm rifles Three 7.62x39mm rifles 14 handguns	999 rounds of ammunition (7.62x39mm, 5.56x45mm, .40 S&W, 9mm, .25 ACP)		Container coming from Florida
29 April 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti	One .40 handgun	13 rounds of 9x19mm	2 magazines	Container from Port Everglades, Florida

		One 9x19mm handgun			
11 June 2024	Cap Haitien Haiti		150 rounds of ammunition	Conversion kit (handgun to rifle)	
31 October 2024	Miami USA	One 5.56x45mm rifle One 22LR		2 magazines	Commercial vessel
16 January 2025	Miami USA	Seven 9mm handgun One .380 pistol One .45 handgun	900 rounds of .223 100 rounds of 5.56x45mm 640 rounds of 7.62 646 rounds of 9mm 2286	18 magazines Barrel extension for a handgun	Commercial vessel Container heading to Cap-Haitian
January 2025	Haina Port, Dominican Republic	Seven 9mm handguns Thirty rifles (mostly 7.62x39mm)		37 magazines	Commercial vessel Container from Brooklyn
25 February 2025	Haina Port, Dominican Republic	16 7.62x39mm rifles One 50. Rifle One 9mm sub-machine gun Five 9mm handguns	20 000 rounds of 7.62x39mm 16 000 rounds of 5.56x45mm 36,000	18 magazines for rifles 13 magazines for 9mm handguns 1 magazine for 50. Rifle 1 silencer	Commercial vessel Container in transit from Miami Heading to Belladère, Haiti
23 September 2025	Port-au-Prince International Airport	.40 handgun 5.56x45mm rifle			Air freight from the USA
24 October 2025	Port-au-Prince International Airport		4,000 rounds of inert ammunition	245 magazines for handguns	Air freight from the USA
October 2025	Port-au-Prince International Airport	Rifle			Air freight from the USA
29 December 2025	Cap-Haitien container terminal	2 x 9mm handguns 7.62x39mm rifle	1800 rounds of 9mm luger ammunition	2 magazines for 9mm handguns 4 magazines for 7.62x39mm rifle	Maritime container from the USA
6 January 2026	Cap-Haitien container terminal	9 x 9mm handguns	5,500 rounds of 7.62x39mm	9 magazines for 9x19mm handguns	Maritime container from the USA
23 January 2026	Cap-Haitien container terminal	2 x 5.56x45mm rifles 3 x 9mm handguns	3400 rounds of ammunition	3 magazines for 9mm handguns 12 magazines for 5.56x45mm rifles	Container coming from Florida
26 January 2026	Cap-Haitien container terminal		2490 x 9mm, 40 x 7.62x39mm, 40 x .30-06 SPRG		Container coming from Florida
21 May 2026	Saint Marc Port	One 9x19mm firearm	1000 rounds of 9x19 mm		Container coming from Florida
TOTAL		69 handguns 67 semi-automatic rifle One 50. caliber rifle	80,944 rounds of various calibers		

Sources: Data provided by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), including through FOIA requests, as well as Haitian, Dominican and US law enforcement agencies, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026.

Annex 17: The use of privately made firearms by armed actors in Haiti

The Panel had previously reported the presence of PMFs manufactured from 80% receivers (see S/2024/704) in the arsenal of gangs, as well as the transfer of firearms components in violation of the embargo. During the reporting period one PMF was documented by the Panel in Cap-Haitien, and several PMFs, likely built in the United States, were seized as part of shipments having violated the arms embargo. Investigations are ongoing.

PMFs are firearms produced by individuals rather than by licensed commercial manufacturers. They may be assembled from part kits, unfinished receivers, or self-manufactured components, including those produced using 3D-printing technology. PMFs are often fabricated and acquired by individuals seeking to circumvent firearms regulations. As they are generally unserialised, they are particularly difficult to trace and therefore present significant challenges for law enforcement authorities.

The rapid evolution of manufacturing technologies, particularly 3D-printing, now enables the production of increasingly sophisticated and reliable firearms that can be difficult for an untrained observer to distinguish from commercially manufactured weapons.

Although the scale of the phenomenon remains difficult to quantify, the proliferation of PMFs appears to be increasing in North America and across the Caribbean region, including Haiti²⁶¹.

Seizure of a FMGC-01 in Cap-Haitien

Documented by the Panel in October 2025, the firearm below was seized on 19 July 2025, in La Madeline, near Cap-Haitien from a car transporting three individuals who claimed to be members of the Ouanaminthe *Brigade de Surveillance des Aires Protégées* (BSAP) unit²⁶². As indicated in previous reports (see S/2024/704, Annex 26), the BSAP is a rogue armed brigade composed of autonomous units operating across the country outside of protected areas, whose members are involved in both local security and criminal activities, including arms trafficking.

This firearm is a rare variant of an advanced 3D-printed firearm, the FGC-9 (for *Fuck Gun Control 9mm*). It is composed at 90% of 3D printed parts mixed with components that can be sourced from any hardware store.²⁶³ The FGC-9 was designed around 2020 by an individual in Europe and a detailed fabrication manual was published online²⁶⁴. Compared with earlier generations of 3D-printed firearms, the design is more advanced and robust, and relatively easy to produce - it no longer requires manufactured firearms components. This firearm could technically fire hundreds of rounds during its lifetime.



Source: Photograph taken by the Panel, Cap Haitien, October 2025

²⁶¹ See also [Dangerous Devices: Privately Made Firearms in the Caribbean | Small Arms Survey](#)

²⁶² Interview with senior police officer, Cap Haitien, October 2025.

²⁶³ Global Ghost Gun Intelligence Network. The FMGC-01. [The FMGC-01- A compact select-fire PCC for Europe | Impro Guns](#)

²⁶⁴ Interview with an expert on PMFs, November 2025.

This particular variant (FMGC – 01) was likely in its beta testing phase (2022) during which the designer disseminated a near final version of the fabrication instructions beyond the core development group to evaluate the making process and the firearm²⁶⁵. This variant was designed by an individual in Europe and likely shared with other PMFs community members in Europe and North America. This is the first FMGC-01 that has been documented outside of the PMF makers community and the chain of custody remains unclear.

²⁶⁵ Interview with an expert on PMFs, November 2025.

Annex 18: Dominican ammunition in use by Haitian gangs

During the reporting period, the Panel documented several types of ammunition that appear to have been diverted from Dominican national stockpiles. Multiple security sources consulted by the Panel, both in the Dominican Republic and in Haiti, indicated that corrupt officers within the Dominican police and armed forces were involved in the diversion of materiel, including sales in border areas for onward transfer to Haiti.

Ammunition from the Dominican police

During its most recent inspections of seizures of ammunition in Port-au-Prince in 2026, the Panel noticed that ammunition consistent with those that had been diverted from the Dominican police as previously reported by the Panel in 2025 (see S/2025/597, section II.C.2.c and Annex 25), were in use by 400 Mawozo and several gangs in Bel-Air, Port-au-Prince.

In 2024, the Panel investigated the seizure of several boxes of 5.56x45mm ammunition (5000 rounds) from non-state actors in Mirebalais, Centre department of Haiti. The Panel shared the information with the Dominican authorities, who conducted an inventory of the Police stockpile and arrested several officers (see Annex 25 of S/2025/597). This shed light on the diversion of 908,001 items, mostly ammunition, from the Dominican National Police stockpile, including more than 489,000 rounds of 9mm, 230,000 rounds of 5.56x45mm, and 26,000 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition, as well as 93,000 12-gauge shells²⁶⁶.

While it is difficult to accurately estimate the amount of materiel that reached Haiti, some Dominican security experts explained to the Panel that, given the fact the market for 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm ammunition in the Dominican Republic is quite limited, it is likely that most of this materiel was moved on to Haiti as these are the two primary calibers used by gangs²⁶⁷.

Ammunition from the Dominican Armed Forces

The Dominican Armed Forces apply the good practice of marking their ammunition, which allows for better management of their stockpiles, and preventing, identifying and investigating diversions.

The Panel identified several types of ammunition marked 'ERD' (Ejercito Republica Dominicana – Dominican Armed Forces) during its latest inspections of seized materiel in February 2026 (see photographs below). The ammunition was consistent with those produced by *Industria Militar de Colombia (Indumil)*. Responding to a Panel's official communication, the Colombian authorities confirmed that the items had been produced by Indumil and were parts of two contracts signed with the ERD and the Dominican Ministry of Defense respectively in 2022.

The Panel contacted the Dominican authorities, asking which units these particular lots of ammunition had been allocated to and whether they could share any information about the results of their investigations into these diversions.

The Dominican authorities responded that the ammunition had been procured in 2022 from a producer in Colombia. Furthermore, they told the Panel that, in December 2025, a second lieutenant from the ERD had been arrested in San Juan de la Maguana Province, Dominican Republic, along with a Haitian national, while transporting 1516 rounds of ammunition on a motorbike²⁶⁸. The prosecution case is ongoing.

The Panel is yet to receive additional information about which units used the various lot numbers or whether further investigations are ongoing.

²⁶⁶ Information provided by the Dominican authorities, 2025.

²⁶⁷ Interviews with security officers, Dominican Republic, 2025.

²⁶⁸ Official communication from the Dominican Republic authorities, March 2026.

All photographs taken by the Panel in 2026:



Markings: ERD (Ejercito Republica Dominicana) – 22 (year of production) – P009 (lot number) – IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).



Markings: ERD (Ejercito Republica Dominicana) – 22 (year of production) – P010 (lot number) – IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).



Markings: ERD (Ejercito Republica Dominicana) – 22 (year of production) – P011 (lot number) – IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).



Markings: ERD (Ejercito Republica Dominicana) – 22 (year of production) – P012 (lot number) – IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).



Markings: 22 (year of production) – P087 (lot number) – IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).



Markings: 22 (year of production) – P088 (lot number) – IM (manufacturer: Industria Militar).



The Panel also documented 7.62x51mm ammunition from the 1970s from a seizure on a gang in Bel Air, which is consistent with materiel currently in use by the Dominican Republic Army²⁶⁹.

²⁶⁹ Confidential source, 2026.

.50 cal ammunition in use by 400 Mawozo

Wilson Joseph, a.k.a “Lanmo San Jou” (Hti.004), leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, posted videos on social media with distinctive surplus .50 cal ammunition which the Panel had identified as being produced in the Dominican Republic in the 1950s (see below). Analysis of .50 cal rounds retrieved from the gang in 2026 has further confirmed this, with at least 15 of 32 rounds documented by the Panel produced in the Dominican Republic. However, the precise chain of custody of this surplus ammunition remains unclear, with quantities of these items having been imported for the United States civilian market in the past and still available for purchase on collectors’ sites²⁷⁰. The Panel sent two tracing requests to the Dominican authorities. The authorities provided photographs of ammunition manufactured by the Armeria de la Fuerzas Armadas de San Cristobal throughout the 1950s up until 1960, and explained that the surplus ammunition was in the process of being destroyed and they had not detected any diversions.



Stills from videos posted on social media by Wilson Joseph, a.k.a “Lanmo San Jou” (Hti.004), leader of the 400 Mawozo gang, showing .50 caliber ammunition with a distinctive yellow tip.

Source: Video shared on social media, 2024

Ammunition seized from 400 Mawozo in 2025 and documented by the Panel:



.50 cal. Ammunition produced in 1958 in the Dominican Republic, photograph taken by the Panel, 2026

²⁷⁰ See for instance [BUYER BEWARE! Dominican AP Yellow Tips - .50BMG Series](#)

Annex 19: Arms and ammunition trafficking to armed actors in the Artibonite department

The surge in armed violence in the Artibonite during the reporting period (see Annex 15) was sustained by the capacity of armed actors - both self-defence groups and gangs - to procure arms and ammunition through multiple trafficking channels. These include the purchasing of materiel to networks procuring in the Dominican Republic as well as individuals using the port of Saint-Marc to transfer items from the United States. For instance, in May 2026, the seizure of one firearm in second hand good coming from the United States led to the domicile of a trafficker where additional materiel was seized (see Annex 16). Beyond international supply, armed actors benefit from diversions from HNP officers, while gangs also receive materiel through inter-gang transfers.

Acquisition of materiel by self-defence groups

Self-defence groups in the lower Artibonite, while much less equipped than the gangs they oppose, have increasingly managed to procure materiel. Financial contributions from the local population- sometimes collected forcibly at checkpoints – and the diaspora are supporting them in purchasing materiel.

In December 2025 and January 2026, the Haitian Customs in Cap-Haitien intercepted several parcels from maritime containers coming from the United States with firearms and ammunition (see Annex 16). The trafficker, Clément Thelusma was arrested and explained that he was selling to various clients, including to the Jean Denis Coalition (see para. 61 of the present report).

Self-defence groups also obtain ammunition from HNP officers with whom they collaborate during operations. In May 2026, a video shared with the Panel shows materiel stolen by the Gran Grif gang from members of the Jean Denis Coalition, including a box of 5,56x45mm ammunition recently imported by the FADH, of which some had been transferred to the HNP (see para. 113 of the present report)²⁷¹.



Source: video shared with the Panel in May 2026.

Acquisition of materiel by gangs

Both Gran Grif and Kokorat San Ras have been displaying new materiel on a regular basis. In October 2025, Kokorat San Ras released a video showing seven brand-new M4-pattern rifles (see picture below), along with six 5,56x45mm magazines. The type of materiel and the packaging in which they were transported likely indicate that they were shipped from the United States entering Haiti labelled as second hand goods.

²⁷¹ Video on file with the Panel



Source: still from video shared with the Panel, October 2025.

Inter-gang transfers

Gran Grif received rifles and ammunition toward the end of February 2026 from Jeff Canaan, leader of the Canaan gang who participated in the brutal attacks in the Artibonite department along Kokorat San Ras and Gran Grif²⁷². This influx of materiel contributed to the surge of attacks that followed in March.

Diversions from police stockpiles

Through loss on the battlefield

The HNP have lost several officers in combats against gangs in the Artibonite department, including 3 members of Unité Temporaire Anti-Gang (UTAG), a specialised tactical unit of the HNP, on 30 May 2026. In a propaganda video (see below), the head of Gran Grif, Luckson Elan, published a video to congratulate his head of cell and show the seized materiel. This includes six firearms consistent with HNP stockpiles (9mm Glocks, one Taurus, one PTR 91 rifle, one M4-type rifles and one Galil rifle), as well as related ammunition and a UTAG flak jacket²⁷³.

²⁷² Confidential source, 2026 and confidential report, 2026.

²⁷³ Video on file with the Panel



Source: still from video showing materiel retrieved from HNP officers by the Gran Grif gang – shared with the Panel in May 2026.

Through theft by HNP officers

Investigations by the Panel indicate that a network of UDMO officers in the Artibonite department have been involved in diversions of ammunition. They sold ammunition to armed individuals involved in land spoliation as well as to gangs²⁷⁴. Their modus operandi included the gradual syphoning of boxes of 20 rounds of 5,56x45 mm ammunition that they would sell for 10.000 Haitian gourdes (roughly \$75 USD). They have also been selling semi-automatic rifles seized by the HNP for between \$5000 and \$8000 USD.

On 3 August 2025, a motorcyclist was arrested by members of the Jean Denis Coalition while transporting boxes of ammunition for the Gran Grif gang. The nine boxes of ammunition had been supplied by Edouens Elan, cousin of Gran Grif leader, Luckson Elan (HTi.00x). The ammunition was consistent with those used by the HNP, including with some that had been donated to the HNP by an international partner. Edouens Elan worked for a local private security company (not registered officially with the Ministry of Interior) whose co-owner is a senior UDMO officer in charge of the logistics and ammunition management for UDMO for the Artibonite department. He is a central figure of the network and used his position to divert ammunition²⁷⁵.

Boxes of 7,62x51mm ammunition coming from the HNP stockpile were also identified in pictures of the arsenal of Destin Wilgens, a.k.a “Tibab”, the late gang leader of Montrouis commune, which had purchased them from an UDMO officer²⁷⁶.

²⁷⁴ Interviews with several HNP officers, local authorities and confidential sources, 2026.

²⁷⁵ Interviews with several HNP officers, local authorities and confidential sources, 2026

²⁷⁶ Interviews with confidential sources, 2026. Photos on file with the Panel.

Annex 20: Loss of materiel from the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS)

Paragraph 14 of resolution 2700 (2024) calls for the MSS to implement weapons and ammunition management processes and to report to the Panel any diversion of weapons and ammunition, including through theft and loss.

During their deployment in Haiti, two Kenyan officers lost their lives and one went missing in clashes and ambushes by gangs, while others were forced to abandon vehicles, potentially with materiel inside. The Panel requested detailed information on all the materiel lost, including types, calibers, manufacturers and serial/lot numbers for firearms/ammunition. The Panel also asked to know the names of the gang(s) which likely took custody of the materiel.

In addition, the Panel documented several rounds of ammunition seized from gangs which seem consistent with those used by the Kenyan Police while deployed in Haiti. The Panel requested the Kenyan authorities to confirm whether the ammunition below was indeed used by Kenyan MSS personnel and how the rounds escaped their custody.



Source: photo taken by the Panel, 2026

Markings: KOFC (Kenyan Ordnance Factory Corporation)

Lot: 30A

Year of production: 21

On 6 July 2026, the Kenyan authorities responded that in the course of operations, the MSS experienced loss of equipment in Port-au-Prince, including during a gang ambush in Kenscoff and a road traffic incident in Thomassin in August 2025, which resulted in deaths or serious injuries of MSS personnel. All losses were documented and comprehensive Boards of Inquiry were conducted.

The materiel lost included firearms (one G3 rifle, one anti-riot gun, one PG 540 tear gas launcher), magazines (11 for AK-type rifles, 614 for G3 rifles) and ammunition (120 rounds of 7,62x39mm, 55 rounds of 5,56x45mm and 20 rounds of 7,62x51mm). According to the Kenyan authorities, the materiel was lost in areas under the control of the following gangs: 5 Second led by Izo, Krazye Barye led by Vitelhomme Innocent, Ti Bwa led by Chrisla and Wharf Jeremie led by Micanor.

The Kenyan authorities stated that the materiel found in unauthorized hands (see the ammunition above) was a result of the above mentioned losses.

Annex 21: The diverse ways characterizing kidnappings

- Targetting affluent areas, including in the 'green zones': Gang influence is being felt in areas including those considered to be 'safer,' or initially considered as 'green zones', such as Pétion-Ville, in their effort to kidnap 'high-value' targets for maximizing revenue (ransom). Gangs infiltrate those areas by deploying 'spies' to identify potential targets based on their social status (wealth) or those with family ties abroad.²⁷⁷

- Involvement of some HNP officers: Some HNP officers also undertake kidnappings in a pattern similar to gangs that impersonate them. Security agents are therefore faced with the challenge of differentiating between gang-impersonated kidnapping and police-engineered kidnapping.²⁷⁸ In one case, four HNP personnel were linked to a kidnapping incident near the Hotel Montana area in April 2026. This led to some of their HNP colleagues nick-named "amis des quatre - friends of the four" to mobilize protesters on 27 April 2026, in Delmas, Turgeau, Canapé-Vert and Pétion-Ville in West department to agitate until they were released.²⁷⁹

- HNP Tip-offs: The inter-dependence between gangs, government staff and some HNP officers is not new. This relationship is visible in situations where gangs are tipped off by some HNP insiders about impending HNP/security operations (S/2026/241, para. 19; and Annex 12 of the present report). Sources described to the Panel how some HNP officers look aside during patrols to allow gangs escape with victims. They also alert gangs about specific locations of potential victims and their movement patterns.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Interview with two gang analysts and CCE members, June 2026.

²⁷⁸ Interview with a resident of a gang-controlled area, a gang analyst and two HNP officers, May 2026.

²⁷⁹ Interview with a gang analyst, a HNP investigator and two Delmas residents, May 2026.

²⁸⁰ Interview with anti-kidnapping official, a gang analyst and two HNP officers, June 2026.

Annex 22: CBP data on bulk cash seized from individuals departing the United States for Haiti (July 2025 to May 2026). As shown, the bulk of the cash related to outbound movements.

A	B	C	D	E	F
OFO Currency Amount Seized Inbound from Haiti or Existing from The U.S.A (Outbound) to Haiti July 1, 2025 through June 1, 2026					
Calendar Date (mm/dd/yyyy)	Inbound Outbound Indicator	Field Office Name	Destination Country Name	Statute Name	Currency Seized (US) Amount
07/03/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	18USC1960, 31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A)	\$71.982
07/03/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A)	\$20.380
07/25/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A)	\$19.169
08/10/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A), 31USC5332, 31USC5332(C),31USC5332(A)	\$103.244
11/14/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A)	\$28.991
11/14/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A)	\$19.253
12/07/2025	INBOUND	BOSTON	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(B), 31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(2)	\$1
12/15/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A)	\$10.965
12/15/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A)	\$24.469
12/22/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(B), 31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5324(C)	\$61.709
12/26/2025	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A)	\$14.340
01/28/2026	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(B)	\$17.176
04/26/2026	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A),31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5324 (C)	\$19.068
05/17/2026	OUTBOUND	MIAMI	HAITI	31USC5317(C)(2),31USC5316(A)(1)(A), 31USC5332(C),31USC5332(A)	\$18.145
				Total:	\$428.892

Source: Data provided by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) based on a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request by the Panel in May 2026.