The Legal Control Unit (UCL) is a specialized unit of the Vote Tabulation Centre (CTV) which aims to maintain the integrity of the results by protecting the right of voters to the taking account of the votes cast legitimately. Its members are guided by the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by the requirements of the Constitution of Haiti (1987) and the Electoral Law 2008. The function of the UCL is to determine the disposition to take for each Minutes (PV) showing signs of abnormality that could compromise the integrity of the preliminary results of the vote. Its decisions are of administrative nature and are not intended to pre-empt or replace the legal process of dispute and the BEDC/BCEN (Departmental Electoral Challenges Office/National Electoral Challenges Office)

UCL examine the documents available for a given PV, in order to determine its validity and if necessary, to reconstitute it. In general the UCL:

• Decides on the inclusion or not of the PV data in the preliminary results on the basis of the electoral law

  and reference documents; Note: The reference documents are the tally sheet and the Partial Electoral List (LEP)

• Reconstructs the PV poorly written but for which the LEP and the tally sheet is included in the bag; Note: The original PV is in no way altered or modified by the UCL. If necessary, the data to tabulate are stipulated on the PV of provision written and signed by the lawyer responsible for the treatment of PV.

• Analyzes the PV which the results differ significantly from the average of other polling station (surrounding BV) and presenting a potential of fraud.

• Determines the validity of any other PV identified by the visual inspection unit, Quality Control, Quality Assurance Committee or the Management Unit of the CTV, and likely to contain one or several irregularities.

Verification Process:

Operations performed by the lawyers of the UCL

• Verifies that the PV was written on a printed authentic. If yes, ensure that the print used corresponds well to the BV in review;

• Verifies the identity of PV (number and identity code of BV) to ensure that the received document matches to the cases submitted.

• Checks the presence of all data of vote required, including for the reference "Oken Kandida".

• Verifies that the sensitive parts of the PV are readable.

• Verify that no sensitive parts of the PV contains any erasures - crossing-out.

• Verifies the consistency between the data of votes recorded in figures and in words.

• Research any sign of attempt of alteration information of votes, on the PV.

• Verifies the presence the LEP.

• Checks that the LEP corresponds to the PV submitted for examination.

• Checks for the presence of hooks or X combined with the absence of numbers of National Identity Card (CIN).

• Research the presence of profiles of filling of PV, potentially indicative of fraud.

• Verifies the presence of the signatures of Members of polling stations at the bottom of the PV.

• Verifies that the number of numbers of CIN is equal to the total number of the votes recorded in the PV.

• Check that the numbers of CIN listed on the LEP reflect the values ​​of barcodes printed.

• Verifies the tally sheet if available;

Criteria and provisions :

Rules that determine the disposition of the minutes which will be indicated by lawyer of the UCL:

• Printed inauthentic: shelving

• The print used does not match to the BV in review: Shelving

• Vote data missing If impossible to reconstruct the PV: possible shelving

• Sensitive parts of the PV unreadable. If impossible to reconstruct the PV: possible shelving

• PV with erasures - croosing-out fraudulent : shelving

• PV with non-fraudulent erasures indicate the values: to consider

• Fraudulent tampering: shelving

• Data of votes entered in numbers and letters non-concordant and non-fraudulent if impossible to reconstruct possible shelving

• Total number of votes exceeds the number of voters for the BV : shelving

• President's signature missing : shelving

• President's signature presents, but a signature of MBV is missing but incident recorded and signed: consideration

Principles of shelving :

During all the tabulations, since the 2006 presidential elections until the election of the first third of the Senate in 2009, many PVs showed obvious signs of fraudulent alteration. CTV's mission is not to filter or eliminate fraud committed upstream. However, it can not ignore the cases to fraudulent PVs coming to its attention. The CTV can not neither morally nor legally and in accordance with universal democratic principles, included in the results that it compiles some PV that it knows have reasonable evidence of fraud. Moreover, given the massive growth of fraud in elections in the first round of the presidential and legislative elections of 2010, the CTV has conducted to a major strengthening of its ability to filter out fraudulent PV.

The lawyers of the UCL determines the necessity or not to put away a PV The shelving is not definitive because it is a measure of administrative level and not judicial. The candidates or their duly authorized representatives may challenge the shelving of PV within 72 hours after the publication of the preliminary results and thus begin the legal process of challenge.

The shelving affects the PV in its entirety because the CTV can not replace the process, of challenging of the BCED and BCEN and is not empowered to implement Article 182 of the Electoral Law of 2008.

See also :

https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-2644-haiti-elections-reasons-to-send-a-minute-to-the-legal-control-unit.html

HL/ HaitiLibre / CEP